Ethical Issues in Representing Thrifts by Monse, Michelle D.
Buffalo Law Review 
Volume 40 Number 1 Article 4 
1-1-1992 
Ethical Issues in Representing Thrifts 
Michelle D. Monse 
University of Alabama 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview 
 Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, and the Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Michelle D. Monse, Ethical Issues in Representing Thrifts, 40 Buff. L. Rev. 1 (1992). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol40/iss1/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ University at 
Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital 
Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact lawscholar@buffalo.edu. 
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Volume 40 Winter 1992 Number 1
Ethical Issues in Representing Thrifts
MICHELLE D. MONSE*
I. INTRODUCTION
A SSUME that a lawyer represents a savings and loan association
owned by a holding company. The president of the holding com-
pany owns a controlling interest in the stock, and a handful of company
directors owns the remainder. During the course of the representation,
the lawyer documents and consummates a number of loans. Thrift of-
ficers or employees underwrite and approve each of the loans, but many
of the loans violate federal savings and loan regulations.
Eventually, the thrift becomes insolvent because of unsafe lending
practices. The federal regulators close the institution, pay insured deposi-
tors or sell the institution, and fire the law firm. Soon thereafter, the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), as receiver, brings a
malpractice action against the lawyer claiming, in part, that the lawyer
had a conflict of interest by favoring the interests of the president and
other controlling persons over the interests of the institution.
In this hypothetical situation, who was the attorney's client? Should
the lawyer have depended on the officers and directors of the institution
to determine and articulate the best interests of the entity? Did the law-
yer owe any duty to depositors or federal regulators? If the lawyer owed
any duties to third parties, how did those duties affect the attorney's
other duties of confidentiality and loyalty to the nominal corporate cli-
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ent? Should the lawyer have notified regulators if she suspected wrong-
doing within the lending institution?
This dilemma of the lending lawyer is far from hypothetical, as a
number of former counsel to lending institutions can attest. A number of
pending suits based on similar facts allege that attorneys committed mal-
practice and other legal and ethical violations.' Observers expect many
1. The Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) was the plaintiff in suits
against professionals prior to the passage of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and En-
forcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of U.S.C.) [hereinafter FIRREA]. FIRREA reorganized thrift regulatory agencies and distributed
responsibilities among them. The Act dissolved the FSLIC and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board
(FHLBB); transferred responsibilities to the existing Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC); and created two new agencies, the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC), and the Office of
Thrift Supervision (OTS).
The FDIC, formerly the insurer of commercial banks, now also insures thrift deposits, FIRREA
§ 211, 103 Stat. 218 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. §.1821(a)); manages or sells failed thrift institutions
as conservator or receiver, FIRREA § 212, 103 Stat. 222 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1821); and
enforces thrift regulations, FIRREA § 902, 103 Stat. 450 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1818).
FIRREA also created the RTC, which the FDIC manages. The RTC is responsible for resolving
thrift failures occurring between Jan. 1, 1989, and August 1, 1992, the third anniversary date of the
Act. FIRREA § 501(b)(3), 103 Stat. 369 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1441a).
FIRREA formed the OT as a branch of the Department of the Treasury. FIRREA § 301, 103
Stat. 278 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1462a). The OTS assumed many of the functions formerly
performed by the FHLBB, such as regulatory examinations of thrifts. FIRREA § 310, 103 Stat. 282
(to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1464).
As a result of these organizational changes, both the FDIC and RTC act as plaintiffs in suits
against former thrift counsel.
The FDIC's records show fifty-three direct suits against former bank and thrift counsel as of July
1991. FDIC, Professional Liability Law Suits against Individual Attorneys/Law Firms as of July
17, 1991 (on file with Author). The legal press reports a similar number of lawsuits, and approxi-
mately one hundred settlements with attorneys or firms since early 1990. Sherry Sontag, Soured
Deals Snag More Professionals, NA'rL L.J., Feb. 4, 1991, at 1, 31.
Some of the complaints filed against former thrift counsel allege ordinary malpractice, such as the
failure to document a loan properly. See, eg., FSLIC v. Law Offices of Guy W. Olano, Jr., No. 85-
4230 (E.D. La. filed Sept. 17, 1985) (erroneous title opinion and other documentary deficiencies).
This Article, however, will discuss only the complaints raising more complex questions of profes-
sional responsibility. Those cases include: FDIC v. Shrader & York, No. H-91-1372 (S.D. Tex. filed
May 17, 1991); FDIC v. Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, No. A-90-CA-925 (W.D. Tex. filed Oct. 30,
1990); FDIC v. Vaughn, No. CA3-90-1282-D (N.D. Tex. filed June 4, 1990); FDIC v. Davidson,
No. CV-90-0715-S (W.D. La. filed Apr. 24, 1990); FDIC v. Martin, No. 90-409-CIV-T-17B (M.D.
Fla. filed Apr. 6, 1990); FDIC v. Bauman, No. CA3-90-614-H (N.D. Tex. filed Mar. 19, 1990);
Universal Serv. Corp. v. Groom, No. 89-10193 (133 Jud. Dist Tex. filed Mar. 9, 1989), removed to
federal court as No. H-90-573 (S.D. Tex. filed Feb. 16, 1990); FDIC v. Matherne, No. 89-5388 (E.D.
La. filed Dec. 18, 1989); FSLIC v. Schoenberger, No. 89-2756 (E.D. La. filed June 19, 1989); FSLIC
v. Talley, No. 89-2755 (E.D. La. filed June 19, 1989); FSLIC v. Lensing, Gravel, Rosenzweig, Chris-
ten & LeBeau, P.C., No. 89-329 (M.D. La. filed Apr. 28, 1989); FSLIC v. Fazio, No. 89-328 (M.D.
La. filed Apr. 28, 1989); Royal Palm Say. Bank v. Rosen, No. 88-8566 (S.D. Fla. filed Dec. 23,
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more suits by various regulatory agencies.2 Further, Congress recently
amended the banking laws to give regulators greater enforcement tools
against lawyers and other independent contractors for depository
institutions.'
1988); FDIC v. Reggie, No. 88-2013 (W.D. La. filed Aug. 5, 1988); and FSLIC v. Dreyer and Traub,
No. 88-279-CIV-J-16 (M.D. Fla. filed Apr. 8, 1988).
This Article will focus on thrifts because of the apparently higher incidence of misconduct within
those institutions. But regulators have also sued former bank lawyers. The cases pending against
former bank counsel as of April 1, 1991, include: FDIC v. Eckert Seamans Cherin & Mellott, No.
CV-90-488 (E.D.N.Y. filed Feb. 8, 1990); FDIC v. Cassel, No. 88-854-CIV-ORL-19 (M.D. Fla. filed
Sept. 26, 1988); and FDIC v. Rubinstein, No. 87-959-CIV-ORL-18 (M.D. Fla. filed Oct. 29, 1987).
Several well-publicized cases have settled: FDIC v. Wise, No. 90-F-1688 (D. Colo. filed Sept. 21,
1990) (involving representation of Silverado Savings Association of Denver, Colorado, by Sherman
& Howard); FSLIC v. Vineyard, No. CA5-87-124 (N.D. Tex. filed June 17, 1987) (involving repre-
sentation of State Savings and Loan of Lubbock, Texas, by Jenkens & Gilchrist); and FDIC v.
Jacoby, No. CA86-1894 (S.D. Fla. filed Sept. 5, 1986), consolidated as MDL No. 655 (E.D. Pa.)
(involving representation of Sunrise Savings and Loan Association of West Palm Beach, Florida, by
Blank, Rome, Comiskey & McCauley). See NAT'L LJ., July 1, 1991, at 2, col. 2 (reporting Sherman
& Howard settlement); Christi Harlan, Jenkens Agrees to Settle Case of Malpractice, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 11, 1989, at B3 (reporting Jenkens & Gilchrist settlement); and 55 Banking Rep. (BNA) 71
(July 9, 1990) (reporting Blank, Rome settlement).
Smaller firms have also been caught up in the malpractice maelstrom. For example, a threatened
suit against a firm in Pine Bluff, Arkansas, reportedly settled for $12 million before suit was filed.
Christi Harlan, Arkansas Firm Pays $12 Million Over S&L Claims, WALL ST. J., Sept. 6, 1989, at
B7.
The only case that has been tried, to the knowledge of the Author, is FDIC v. Mmahat, 97 B.R.
293 (Bankr. E.D. La. 1988), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 907 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1990), and cert
denied, I 11 S. Ct. 1387 (1991), resulting in a judgment of $35 million against counsel and his law
firm. The judgment is reportedly one of the largest legal malpractice awards ever. WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 14, 1988, at A20.
2. 55 Banking Rep. (BNA) 399 (Sept. 10, 1990) (report of press conference given on August 24,
1990, by officials of the OTS indicating the agency's intention to pursue professionals vigorously);
Linda Himelstein, Malpractice Mayhem: RTC Officials Eye 140 Suits Against Lawyers, LEGAL
TIMES, Nov. 19, 1990, at 1 (RTC expects to pursue additional 140 claims against attorneys).
Responding to the growing body of claims against former counsel, the American Bar Association
formed a task force in 1990 to study the liability of counsel for depository institutions. 55 Banking
Rep. (BNA) 755 (Nov. 5, 1990). The task force did not expect to complete the study until the
autumn of 1991. Telephone interview with Keith Fisher, Chair of ABA Task Force (Mar. 26, 1991).
3. Thrift attorneys now have independent duties under new legislation enacted as a result of the
thrift crisis. The savings and loan rescue bill, FIRREA, enacted in 1989, imposes substantial civil
and criminal penalties upon attotneys who participate in wrongdoing. The enforcement provisions
of the Act now apply to each "institution-affiliated party," a phrase that includes attorneys and other
independent contractors.
An attorney is an institution-affiliated party if he or she knowingly or recklessly participated in 1)
any violation of law or regulation, 2) breach of fiduciary duty, or 3) unsafe and unsound practice. In
addition, the action must have had a significant adverse impact on the institution, or must have
caused (or appeared likely to cause) more than a minimal financial loss to the institution. FIRREA
§ 204(4), 103 Stat. 193 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1813).
Violations are punishable by a range of civil and criminal penalties. Civil fines for individuals
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Because of the immensity of the thrift debacle,4 public attention has
turned to the role of attorneys and other professionals in facilitating mis-
conduct. Although many attorneys would defend the conduct of lending
attorneys under an orthodox view of the attorney-client relationship, dis-
sent is beginning to emerge. In discussing the activities of attorneys and
accountants who worked for Charles Keating, one of the most notorious
thrift operators, one judge recently lamented:
Where were these professionals, a number of whom are now asserting their
rights under the Fifth Amendment, when these clearly improper transac-
tions were being consummated?
Why didn't any of them speak up or disassociate themselves from the
transactions?
Where also were the outside accountants and attorneys when these transac-
tions were effectuated?
What is difficult to understand is that with all the professional talent in-
volved (both accounting and legal), why at least one professional would not
range from $5,000 to $1,000,000 per day so long as the violation continues. Id. § 907 (a), 103 Stat.
462 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1813).
In a definition that may be even more frightening to attorneys, the statute also says the term
"violation" includes "any action... for or toward causing, bringing about, participating in, counsel-
ing, or aiding and abetting a violation." Id. § 204(0, 103 Stat. 193 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1813).
Since counseling a violation is treated the same way as the underlying primary violation, attorneys
might justifiably be concerned that rendering ordinary legal advice might later be penalized under
the statute.
The House Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs Committee said that it did not intend to make
attorneys liable for "good faith activities falling within the traditional attorney-client relationship."
H.R. No. 54, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I, at 467 (1989). But the language of the House Report is
sufficiently equivocal to suggest extra caution by attorneys advising thrifts and other depository
institutions. For example, the House Report says that advice given when the law or regulations are
unclear, even when that advice conflicts with positions taken by regulatory authorities, "would not
usually or necessarily show bad faith." Id. (emphasis supplied). By qualifying the sentence in this
way, the Committee implicitly suggests that giving advice of this type could violate the statute in
some circumstances.
For a review of the independent contractor provisions, see Raymond G. Kowalski, Note, Liability
of Attorneys, 4ccountants, Appraisers, and Other Independent Contractors Under the Financial Insti.
tutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, 42 HASTINGS L. 249 (1990).
4. In early hearings on FIRREA, the Bush Administration estimated that it would cost $90
billion to resolve the then-current caseload of failed and recently-closed institutions. Problemns of the
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corp. [FSLICJ] Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. II, at 34 (1989) (testimony of Nicholas F.
Brady, Secretary of the Treasury). The Secretary of the Treasury has repeatedly estimated that the
entire cost of the bailout would not exceed $130 billion in 1990 dollars. Stephen Labaton, New
Finance Woes: F.D. IC. Loss Worse; S.& L Crisis Deeper, N.Y. TIMEs, June 11, 1991, at A1, Dl.
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have blown the whistle to stop the overreaching that took place in this
case.
5
Vexing questions, all, and the current law answers them imperfectly. Is-
sues of client identity lie at the heart of the problem. Because of the
legal fiction that a corporation is a juridical person separate from any of
its constituent parts, the lawyer, it is said, represents that artificial being
alone.7  Yet artificial beings require actual beings to speak and act for
them. Ordinarily, the interests of the constituents and the entity coincide
- if the entity can be said to have genuine interests of its own. But many
instances arise in which the entity's interests are difficult to ascertain, or
those interests conflict with constituents' interests or with public policy.
At that point, it becomes vital, yet markedly more difficult, for the law-
yer to answer the central question, "who is the client?"
The thrift lawyer is not alone in struggling with these issues: law-
yers for typical for-profit corporations,' close corporations, 9 labor un-
5. Lincoln Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901, 920 (D.D.C. 1990) (Sporkin, J.).
Coincidentally, Judge Sporkin worked as Director of Enforcement for the Securities Exchange Com-
mission (SEC) in the 1970s, a period during which the SEC strongly advocated increased responsibil-
ities from securities counsel to the investing public. Sontag, supra note 1, at 1, 31. See also infra text
accompanying notes 146-64 for a discussion of some of the SEC's activities during that period.
As of June 1990, two law firms representing Lincoln Savings and Loan Association had settled
private fraud claims brought by bondholders, although fraud or malpractice suits by federal authori-
ties were still possible. The thrift's accountants had not yet settled. Rita Jensen, Kaye Scholer Settle-
ment Is Reported, NAT'L LJ., June 11, 1990, at 3, 26.
6. "Financial institution counsel can no longer be sure of the identity of the client., or at least
how the 'client' will be defined in possible actions against the firm." 55 Banking Rep. (BNA) 755
(Nov. 5, 1990) (discussing an ABA task force established to study the liability of counsel for deposi-
tory institutions).
7. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct provide that "[a) lawyer employed or retained by
an organization represents the organization acting through its duly authorized constituents."
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.13(a) (1983) [hereinafter MODEL RULES].
"Constituents" includes the officers, directors, employees, and shareholders of corporate clients, or
their equivalents in non-corporate clients. Id. Rule 1.13 cmt.
Similarly, the Model Code of Professional Responsibility provides that "[a] lawyer employed or
retained by a corporation or similar entity owes his allegiance to the entity and not a stockholder,
director, officer, employee, representative, or other person connected with the entity." MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY EC 5-18 (1980) [hereinafter MODEL CODE].
8. A substantial body of legal literature exists chronicling the problems of corporate representa-
tion. A sampling of the literature includes: Ralph Jonas, Who Is the Client? The Corporate Law-
yer's Dilemma, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 617 (1988); James R. McCall, The Corporation as Client
Problems, Perspectives, and Partial Solutions, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 623 (1988); Maureen H. Burke, The
Duty of Confidentiality and Disclosing Corporate Misconduct, 36 Bus. LAW. 239 (1981); John M.
Ferren, The Corporate Lawyer's Obligation to the Public Interest, 33 Bus. LAW. 1253 (1978); Junius
Hoffman, On Learning of a Corporate Client's Crime or Fraud - The Lawyer's Dilemma, 33 Bus.
LAW. 1389 (1978).
9. For a recent look at the subject of close corporations, see Lawrence E. Mitchell, Professional
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ions,1 ° and other unincorporated associations1 all face similar issues.
But the thrift lawyer, unlike lawyers for many other entities, deals with a
highly-regulated industry that is strongly imbued with the public inter-
est. When a lawyer is representing a client of this type, the shoe of the
traditional entity fiction begins to pinch. Regulators depend on individ-
ual lawyers to ensure regulatory compliance. It is the thesis of this arti-
cle that thrift lawyers had conflicts of interest within the thrift
representations. Moreover, based on other case trends, those lawyers
had duties of loyalty and disclosure to depositors and regulators, con-
trary to the traditional entity theory.
II. ORGANIZATION OF THRIFTS AND ALLEGATIONS AGAINST
COUNSEL
A. Organization of Thrifts
The savings and loan associations of today barely resemble their
forerunners, the building societies or building and loan associations of
the nineteenth century. The early building associations financed home
construction for working people within small communities. Contempo-
rary thrifts, in contrast, finance commercial projects over broad geo-
graphical areas. Still, the tightly-knit nature of the early associations
generated structural differences between thrifts and other types of deposi-
tory institutions, and among thrifts themselves. Many of those differ-
ences still exist, and they may affect the ethical duties owed by thrift
counsel.
During the nineteenth century, the increasing population and indus-
trialization of this country created a large class of wage earners who had
limited savings. These workers needed secure places to put their money,
but the commercial banks were not interested in small deposits."2 Fur-
ther, the workers needed a source of home financing, which commercial
banks were similarly unwilling to provide.13 Relatively small groups of
persons organized the building and loan associations to provide a safe
Responsibility and the Close Corporation Toward a Realistic Ethic, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 466
(1989).
10. See Florian Bartosic & Gary Minda, Union Fiduciaries, Attorneys, and Conflicts of Interest,
15 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 227 (1981); and James G. Pope, Two Faces, Two Ethic" Labor Union
Lawyers and the Emerging Doctrine of Entity Ethics, 68 OR. L. REv. 1 (1989).
11. See, eg., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978) (representation of trade association).
12. LEwis J. SPELLMAN, THE DEPOSITORY FIRM AND INDUSTRY 19-20 (1982).
13. Id. at 21.
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place for members' savings and a means of financing their residences.14
The members owned and managed the associations for their mutual ben-
efit. Once all the members had received a loan, the association dissolved
itself and distributed any remaining funds among the members."
The associations did not accept deposits from, or make loans to,
non-members. Members could not withdraw their funds except by leav-
ing the association entirely, after giving notice and paying a penalty. 6
Members were known as shareholders because, like shareholders in a
typical corporation, they owned an equity interest in the assets and were
entitled to a share of the association's earnings. 7 Associations organized
according to this model became known as mutual savings associations.
Over time, the building and loan associations changed to better suit
the needs of small borrowers. Associations began accepting deposits
from those who wished to join the association after its inception, but who
did not wish to borrow funds." As the number of participants increased,
so did the members' general unwillingness to manage the institution.
Eventually, the members delegated association management to elected
directors and officers.' 9
The organizational and ownership structure of the old building as-
sociations continues in mutual savings associations today. The mutual
associations, as they have evolved, operate much like other forms of
thrift associations: they take deposits, pay interest, and make loans. De-
spite these operational similarities, shareholders in a mutual savings asso-
14. The first American thrift, the Oxford Provident Building Association, had thirty-six charter
members when it began in 1831 in Frankford, Pennsylvania. Most of its members were textile work-
ers, and they formed the association "'to enable contributors thereof to build or purchase dwelling
houses."' ALAN TECK, MUTUAL SAVINGS BANKS AND SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS 22-24
(1968) (quoting from constitution of Oxford Provident Building Association). The association dis-
solved ten years later after all members had taken loans.
15. Id. at 22.
16. Id. at 23.
17. R. DAN BRUMBAUGH, JR., THRIFTS UNDER SIEGE 3 (1988). A depositor, in contrast, is a
person who delivers an asset to the institution and receives in return a debt obligation of the institu-
tion. Id.
18. TaCK, supra note 14, at 31-32.
As was to recur in the halcyon days of the early 1980s, members of the real estate industry were
eager participants in the expansion of building associations.
Many lawyers and realtors found the management of building associations a useful
source of financing for customers and fees for various services, and in the late 19th and
early part of the 20th centuries a substantial fraction of the associations were organized
as auxiliaries to law and real estate businesses.
Edward S. Herman, Conflicts of Interest in the Savings and Loan Industry, in 2 STUDY OF THE
SAVINGS AND LOAN INDUSTRY 960 (Irwin Friend ed., 1969) (Appendix A).
19. TEcK, supra note 14, at 32.
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ciation still "legally own and theoretically control the association and are
the residual claimants to its income.",
20
The other principal form of thrift institution is a stock association.
In a stock association, private shareholders own the institution. In con-
trast to their position in mutual savings association, depositors in a stock
association do not own or manage the institution. Instead, depositors are
treated as creditors of the institution.21
[A stock association] issues a special class of permanent or guarantee stock,
which is not withdrawable, as are the ordinary shares of savings and loan
associations, but which must be bought and sold at varying prices on the
open market....
This institutional form permits a small body of shareholders to assume
full legal control of the association.2 2
Mutual associations were the dominant form of savings association
for many decades.23  But beginning around 1980, the stock ownership
form of association began to gain popularity. By 1988, more than forty
percent of insured thrifts were stock associations.24
Although different classes of persons own mutual and stock associa-
tions, some evidence suggests that, in most respects, the two types of
associations operate similarly. Both mutual and stock associations tend
to be dominated by a small group of persons, with power flowing out-
ward from this small control group rather than inward from sharehold-
20. Herman, supra note 18, at 782.
21. "In savings and loan associations with capital stock outstanding, as in commercial banks
and almost all other types of capital stock organizations, stockholders have all of the membership
and ownership rights and obligations. In these institutions, borrowers are debtors and saver$ are
depositor-creditors. . . ." TECK, supra note 14, at 35-36. Cf. Lawrence v. Bank of America, 209 Cal.
Rptr. 541 (Ct. App. 1985) (bank and depositor stand in debtor-creditor relationship).
22. Herman, supra note 18, at 782.
23. The stock form of ownership began to attract interest in the 1880s and 1890s, and again in
the 1950s. Id. at 784.
As of 1968, mutual associations represented 85% of the savings associations and 78% of the
assets held by thrifts in this country. Id. at 782. Even by the end of 1980, mutual associations still
represented 81% of American thrifts. U.S. LEAGUE OF SAVINGS ASSOCIATIONS, '81 SAVINGS AND
LOAN SOURCEBOOK 38 (1981) (3,742 of 4,613 thrifts were mutual associations).
24. Of the 2,949 insured thrifts existing as of December 31, 1988, 1,285 (44%) were stock as-
sociations. More than a third of the FSLIC-insured stock savings associations were located in just
three states: California, Florida, and Texas. U. S. LEAGUE OF SAVINGS INSTITUTIONS, '89 SAVINGS
INSTITUTIONS SOURCEBOOK 45-46 (1989).
Some of the reasons for mutual-to-stock conversions include: 1) directors and the public more
readily understand the stock organizational form; 2) stock sales increase reserves; 3) the institution
can sell debt more inexpensively; 4) the stock form facilitates mergers and acquisitions; and 5) the
possibility of stock ownership may aid in the recruitment and retention of management. WALTER J.
WOERHEIDE, THE SAVINGS AND LOAN INDUSTRY 178 (1984).
[Vol. 40
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ers.25 Nonetheless, stock associations tend to grow more quickly, take
more risks, and be more profitable than mutual associations.26 They may
also pose greater risks of loss and problems of supervision to regulators.z7
B. Allegations Against Thrift Counsel
Federal authorities have filed many lawsuits nationally against pro-
fessionals, such as attorneys, accountants, and appraisers, for their activi-
ties on behalf of various savings and loan associations.2 8  Although the
suits emanate from thrifts of different sizes in different parts of the coun-
try, certain fact patterns are common to several of the suits filed against
thrift counsel.29 Often a single, dominant individual controlled the stock
of the institution or its holding company. Many of these individuals or-
ganized or purchased the thrifts in the early 1980s when various statu-
tory and regulatory changes made thrift ownership a potentially lucrative
business.30 Frequently, the attorneys represented the dominant individ-
25. Id. at 802-03.
26. Eugene F. Brigham & R. Richardson Pettit, Effects of Structure on Performance in the Sav-
ings and Loan Industry, in STUDY OF THE SAVINGS AND LOAN INDUSTRY, supra note 18, at 1202-
03.
27. Id. at 1204. Based on anecdotal evidence gleaned from the complaints filed against counsel,
the most troubled thrifts were usually stock associations rather than mutual associations.
28. A list of pending professional liability suits obtained from the FDIC in June of 1990 listed
twenty-six suits against attorneys, eighteen against accountants, and sixteen against appraisers.
Some of the information on that list, however, was inaccurate. For example, the list did not mention
some cases filed the preceding spring.
29. One former attorney for the Federal Home Loan Bank Board identified several recurrent
factors in thrift failures: 1) change of control between 1982 and 1984; 2) dominance of the thrift by
the owner; 3) use of brokered funds to facilitate growth; 4) cessation of traditional home mortgage
financing; 5) concentration on acquisition, development, and construction loan financing. Investiga-
tion of Lincoln Savings & Loan Association Hearing Before the House Comm. on Banking Finance
and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong., 1st Sees., pt. II, 286-87 (1989) (prepared statement of William K.
Black, former General Counsel for the Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco) [hereinafter
Investigation of Lincoln Savings]. Several of these factors reappear in the complaints against former
thrift counsel.
30. The most significant thrift legislation was the Depository Institutions Deregulation and
Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (1980) [hereinafter DIDMCA], and
the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (1982)
[hereinafter the Garn-St. Germain Act].
Among other changes, DIDMCA:
1) Allowed federally-chartered thrifts to make loans on commercial real estate, and investments
in corporate debt securities and commercial paper. DIDMCA § 401, 94 Stat. 151-53 (codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1464(c) (1988)). Thrifts historically had been limited to making residential mortgage loans.
2) Began to eliminate interest ceilings payable on thrift deposits, which allowed thrifts to pursue
deposits more aggressively. DIDMCA §§ 204-207, 94 Stat. 143-44 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3503-
3506 (1988)).
3) Increased deposit insurance from $40,000 to $100,000, DIDMCA § 308(a)(1), 94 Stat. 147
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ual in the initial incorporation or acquisition of the institution and then
represented the institution as a whole. Generally, stock ownership was
not widely distributed, and boards of directors were often captive to the
interests of the controlling person.31
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1724 (1988)), which attracted larger depositors, such as money brokers, to
thrifts.
4) Directed the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) to set net worth requirements for
thrifts, within a range of 3 to 6 percent of liabilities. DIDMCA § 409, 94 Stat. 160 (codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1726(b) (1988)). The FHLBB was the principal thrift regulator until FIRREA dissolved it
and reassigned its functions. FIRREA § 703, 103 Stat. 415 (repealing 12 U.S.C. § 1437).
The Gan-St. Germain Act increased the maximum percentage of an institution's assets that
could be comprised by commercial real estate loans, Gain-St. Germain Act § 322, 96 Stat. 1499
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c)(1)(B) (1988)), and permitted thrifts to create money market ac-
counts, id. § 327, 96 Stat. 1501 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3503 (1988)), and demand deposits, id. § 312,
96 Stat. 1496-97 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1464(b) (1988)).
A series of regulatory changes also occurred. For example, pursuant to its mandate under
DIDMCA, the FHLBB lowered net worth requirements for thrifts, first from 5% to 4% in 1980,
Net Worth Amendments, 45 Fed. Reg. 76,111 (Nov. 18, 1980), and then to 3% of liabilities in 1982,
47 Fed. Reg. 3543 (Jan. 26, 1982) (to be codified as 12 C.F.R. § 563.13). The FHLBB also promul-
gated a series of changes to accounting practices. These so-called "regulatory accounting principles"
allowed the FHLBB "to maintain the fiction that many [savings and loan associations] were not...
insolvent." GEORGE J. BENSTON, AN ANALYSIS OF THE CAUSES OF SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIA-
TION FAILURES 14 (1985). For an illustration of the different results under regulatory accounting
principles and generally accepted accounting principles, see PAUL ZANE PILZER, OTHER PEOPLE'S
MONEY: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE S.& L. MESS 75-76 (1989).
In the words of one writer:
Greatly expanded thrift powers and the prospect of both an economic recovery and some
fall in interest rates made savings and loan charters very attractive. Being able to form,
with as little as $1 million in capital, a new association not burdened by old, low-interest-
rate mortgages and having the right to offer depositors federal deposit insurance and a
net-worth-to-asset ratio of as little as 3 percent seemed too good to be true. Whether
choosing to start from scratch or to buy an existing association, real estate developers,
syndicators, mortgage bankers, and many entrepreneurs with no particular specialty im-
mediately sensed opportunity, especially in states where economic growth was rapid and
regulations were extremely permissive.
NED EICHLER, THE THRIFT DEBACLE 75-76 (1989).
In a 1985 memorandum to examiners, the Federal Home Loan Bank of Chicago identified a
number of "abuse flags" warranting greater attention from examiners. The first item on the list was
"[A] change in control followed by a dramatic change in operational philosophy." FEDERAL HOME
LOAN BANK OF CHICAGO, Memorandum to Examination Staff (December 24, 1985), reprinted In
Adequacy of Federal Efforts to Combat Fraud, Abuse, and Misconduct in Federally Insured Financial
Institutions Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer, and Monetary Affairs of the
House Comm. on Gov't Operations, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 740 (1987) [hereinafter Adequacy of Fed-
eral Efforts].
31. "[A] recurrent characteristic of institutions, particularly S&Ls, evidencing some type of mis-
conduct is their ownership by one individual or a few individuals with a passive management and
board of directors." HOUSE COMM. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS, COMBATING FRAUD, ABUSE, AND
MISCONDUCT IN THE NATION'S FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: CURRENT FEDERAL EFFORTS ARE
INADEQUATE, H.R. REP. No. 1088, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 33-34 (1988) [hereinafter COMBATING
FRAUD].
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Following the changes of control, many of these lending institutions
grew wildly.32 The lawyers and their firms generally served as the princi-
pal or sole counsel for the lending institution, closing a number of real
estate loans and other transactions. Individual lawyers frequently were
directors;33 some also became officers in the institutions.3 4 A few lawyers
became such active managers of the institutions that they later were held
criminally liable for their misconduct.3 5
Counsel were involved in many transactions that allegedly violated
various federal and state regulations, such as the federal limits on aggre-
gated loans to a single borrower or its affiliates (known as the "loans-to-
one-borrower" or "LTOB" rule) 6 and loans to insiders.3 Some transac-
32. Empire Savings and Loan of Mesquite, Texas, for example, grew from $40 million in assets
to $320 million between September 1982 and September 1983. JOHN RING ADAMS, THE BIG FIX
206 (1990). This growth level was typical for many thrifts in Texas: for the forty-one most troubled
thrifts in Texas, assets grew by 190%, between 1982 and 1986, compared to 68% nationally. GOV-
ERNOR'S TASK FORCE ON THE SAVINGS AND LOAN INDUSTRY, REPORT TO THE HONORABLE WIL-
LIAM P. CLEMENTS, JR. I1 (Jan. 25, 1988) (copy on file with Author).
Silverado Savings and Loan of Denver, Colorado, grew from $216 million in assets to $1.8 billion
in assets between 1982 and 1986, a growth rate of more than 800%. Complaint at 8, FDIC v. Wise,
No. 90-F-1688 (D. Colo., filed September 21, 1990).
Some of this dramatic growth may have stemmed from practices critics later found questionable,
such as the heavy reliance on brokered deposits. ADAMS, supra, at 206. Brokered deposits, known
colloquially as "hot money," were large accumulations of cash deposited in thrifts by money market
funds or other deposit brokers, in search of the highest interest rates. "Unlike individual deposit
accounts, brokered deposits could be - and were - moved daily in search of better returns.... For
the most part, individual savers had neither the ability nor the inclination to shift their money
around that often." PILZER, supra note 30, at 72. Brokered deposits made the asset positions of
thrifts appear robust, even though that appearance could change, literally, overnight. But see BEN-
SION, supra note 30, at 169. ("[1It cannot be concluded that brokered deposits should be singled out
from among other sources of funds as the cause of the failures [occurring between 1981 and 1985],
though brokered deposits (among other sources) could have permitted risk-seeking [savings and loan
associations] to have obtained funds for their adventures.").
33. See, eg., Complaint at 8, FDIC v. Wise, No. 90-F1688 (D. Colo. filed Sept. 21, 1990) (attor-
ney served as director of thrift holding company).
34. See, eg., Complaint at 4-5, FDIC v. Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, No. A-90-CA-925 (W.D.
Tex. filed Oct. 30, 1990) (attorney became chief administrative officer and later, chief executive of-
ficer, of thrift holding company).
35. See, eg., United States v. Vineyard, 699 F. Supp. 103 (N.D. Tex. 1988), aff'd sub nom.
United States v. Ryan, 874 F.2d 1052 (5th Cir. 1989). Laurence B. Vineyard, Jr., had served as
attorney or director to a number of thrifts, including Key Savings and Loan Association of Engle-
wood, Colorado; Brownfield Savings and Loan Association of Brownfield, Texas; and State Savings
and Loan Association of Lubbock, Texas. Complaint at 4-5, FSLIC v. Vineyard, No. CA5-87-124
(N.D. Tex. filed June 17, 1987).
36. 12 C.F.L § 563.93 (1991). Prior to FIRREA, the rule was codified at 12 C.F.R. § 563.9-3
(1989). One oft-used vehicle was the nominee loan, in which a straw person acted as the nominal
borrower and the loan proceeds benefitted another person. Adequacy of Federal Efforts, supra note
30, at 605 (appendix to testimony of Oliver B. Revell, Executive Assistant Director, FBI, listing five
most typical frauds used in financial institutions).
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tions were merely temporary transfers of loans between various lending
institutions in order to improve an institution's financial appearance
before an imminent regulatory examination." Many institutions en-
gaged in a number of other activities apparently designed to hide their
true financial condition from regulators.3 9 Some other common transac-
tions, such as "land flips," were not directly designed to evade federal
regulations, but rather to benefit certain persons connected with the
thrift.' Extravagant spending on corporate offices, executive homes,
company parties, executive salaries, and other perquisites also gained tre-
mendous public attention.41
Authorities differ on the role of fraud or misconduct by thrift insid-
37. Regulatory limits apply to "affiliated persons," a term that includes directors, officers, con-
trolling persons, as well as their relatives and associated businesses. 12 C.F.R. § 561.5 (1991). Loans
to affiliated persons currently may not exceed $100,000. Id. § 563.43(b)(5).
38. In these transactions, thrift operators shifted problem loans back and forth among them-
selves to avoid too heavy a concentration of non-performing loans within a single institution. The
FHLBB described this practice as "'chain banking,' whereby other financial institutions would buy
or sell loans from/to the thrift with little or no regard for prudent underwriting. Such schemes were
typically undertaken to circumvent regulatory limitations or prohibitions." Adequacy of Federal
Efforts, supra note 30, at 717 (letter from Federal Home Loan Bank Board). In the parlance of thrift
operators, "[a] rolling loan gathers no loss." PILZER, supra note 30, at 81.
39. As one example, a thrift might foreclose its mortgage on a non-performing loan, then sell
the foreclosed property at an inflated price to a straw borrower. Adequacy of Federal Efforts, supra
note 30, at 99-100 (statement of Anton R. Valukas, U.S. Attorney, Northern District of Illinois). A
transaction of this type improved the institution's net worth in several ways: the institution elimi-
nated a non-performing loan, perhaps produced a gain on the resale of the property, and acquired a
new asset in the form of the new loan to the straw borrower.
40. In a "land flip," various parties bought and sold a parcel of land several times during a short
period of time, often during the same day. With each sale, the price of the land, and the size of the
loans advanced to purchase it, increased. At each stage in the flip, the officers in the thrift had the
opportunity to collect a loan origination fee based on the amount of the loan. Fraudulent appraisals
often accompanied these sales. If the ultimate borrower defaulted, the last lender frequently took a
large loss because the real value of the land was far less than the last appraised value. Adequacy of
Federal Efforts, supra note 30, at 186-87 (statement of M. Danny wall, Chairman, FHLBB). See
also id. at 605 (testimony of Oliver B. Revell, Executive Assistant Director, FBI). One thrift opera-
tor called the last "flip" in a series "The Day of the Great Fool," since the last buyer was left with a
large loan and seriously overvalued property. PILZER, supra note 30, at 93.
For an actual example, see ADAmS, supra note 32, at 205-06, which describes a land flip operated
through Empire Savings andLoan of Mesquite Texas. Empire, closed by regulators in March 1984,
was one of the first dominoes to fall in the chain of thrift failures. Its closure caused regulators to
begin questioning the regulatory and statutory changes made earlier in the decade. LAWRENCE J.
WHrrE, THE S & L DEBACLE 125 (1991).
41. Don Dixon of Vernon Savings and Loan Association, among other activities, used associa-
tion funds to tour the three-star restaurants of France, purchase six Leajets and a yacht, and buy
and decorate multimillion-dollar vacation homes in California and Colorado. MARTIN MAYER,
THE GREATEST-EVER BANK ROBBERY 9-10 (1990). Thrift insiders allegedly diverted the proceeds
of a shopping center loan to retire indebtedness on the yacht, with their counsel's knowledge. Com-
plaint at 38, FDIC v. Bauman, No. CA3-90-614-H (N.D. Tex. filed March 19, 1990).
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ers and related outsiders. One House Report estimated that more than
three-quarters of thrift insolvencies were at least partly attributable to
misconduct.42 Although at least one writer has disputed the exact role of
abusive activities in thrift failures,43 some of the most expensive thrift
failures allegedly involved misconduct.'
The FDIC's allegations against lawyers are not uniform, but they
fall into two large categories of negligence and breach of fiduciary duties.
Within those two larger categories, several issues recur:
1) Participation in insider misconduct. Attorneys purportedly
participated or assisted misconduct by structuring transactions that
violated internal lending policies, federal regulations, federal supervi-
sory agreements or cease and desist orders.45 Common regulatory vio-
lations include loans-to-one-borrower limits and loans to affiliates.
These allegations are sometimes phrased as aiding and abetting
42. Serious misconduct by senior insiders or outsiders (i) has caused, has contributed to,
or was present in the insolvencies of most banks, savings and loans (S&Ls), and credit
unions, and (ii) also has caused large losses in unhealthy and healthy institutions, during
the period 1984 through the first-half of 1987. At least one-third (and probably more) of
commercial bank failures and over three-quarters of all S&L insolvencies appear to be
linked in varying degrees to such misconduct ....
COMBATING FRAuD, supra note 31, at 10.
The Committee included a wide range of activities within the definition of misconduct. Gener-
ally, the term encompassed any action designed to benefit the actor (or an associate of the actor) to
the detriment of the institution. Examples include the payment of excessive compensation and fees,
the extension of preferential treatment to friends or business associates, the acceptance of kickbacks
from customers, the extension of loans to oneself, and the disregard of underwriting standards. Id.
at 7-9.
43. "The bulk of the insolvent thrifts' problems... did not stem from... fraudulent or criminal
activities. These thrifts largely failed because of an amalgam of deliberately high-risk strategies, poor
business judgments, foolish strategies, excessive optimism, and sloppy and careless underwriting,
compounded by deteriorating real estate markets." WHITE, supra note 40, at 117 (emphasis omit-
ted). Even White, however, does not dispute that many violations occurred. Moreover, one ob-
server has explained the differences of opinion as attributable, in part, to definitional differences of
the terms "fraud" and "insider abuse." Fraud in America's Insured Depository Institutions: Hearings
Before the Senate Comm on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 237 (1990)
(statement of Prof. Benton E. Gup, Ph.D.) [hereinafter Fraud in Depository Institutions].
44. For example, the failure of Lincoln Savings and Loan Association, of Irvine, California,
operated by Charles Keating, is estimated to cost $2.5 billion. Stephen Labaton, N.Y. TIMES, June
16, 1990, at Al, A31. The FDIC alleges that the failure of Vernon Savings and Loan Association of
Dallas, Texas, will cost $1 billion. Complaint at 6, Bauman (No. CA3-90-614-H).
45. See, eg., FDIC v. Wise, 758 F. Supp. 1414 (D. Colo. 1991); Complaint at 14, FDIC v.
Shrader & York, No. H-91-1372 (S.D. Tex. filed May 17, 1991); Complaint at 6-11, FDIC v. Jones,
Day, Reavis & Pogue, No. A-90-CA-925 (W.D. Tex. filed Oct. 30, 1990); Complaint at 13-16,
Bauman (No. CA3-90-614-H); Complaint at 6-13, FSLIC v. Lensing, Gravel, Rosenzweig, Christen
& LeBeau, P.C., No. 89-329 (M.D. La. filed Apr. 28, 1989); Complaint, FSLIC v. Fazio, No. 89-328
(M.D. La. filed Apr. 28, 1989); Amended Complaint, FSLIC v. Dreyer and Traub, No. 88-279-CIV-
J-16 (M.D. Fla. filed Apr. 8, 1988).
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breaches by insiders.'
2) Conflicts of interest and failures to exercise independent pro-
fessional judgment. Attorneys allegedly favored the interests of one
group of insiders or favored borrowers at the expense of the institu-
tion, advanced their own interests, or failed to disclose conflicts to dis-
interested management.47
3) Failures to monitor or supervise. Some complaints charge that
law firms did not adequately monitor the behavior of attorneys within
their ranks and did not establish sufficient internal procedures to pro-
tect against misconduct by those attorneys.4a
4) Failures to protect depositors after learning of misconduct or
to disclose appropriate information to regulators. Although the
number of complaints in this category is small, the FDIC has alleged
that counsel had some duties - albeit not clearly defined in the com-
plaints - to depositors or the regulators, or both.4 9
The position of federal regulators can be discerned from additional
sources. In a controversial speech, Harris Weinstein, the Chief Counsel
of the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), opined that thrift fiduciaries (a
group that presumably includes counsel) have a duty to federal regula-
tors to avoid losses, and that this duty is heightened as the institution
46. The FDIC has alleged aiding and abetting of breaches of fiduciary duty in the following:
complaint at 52, FDIC v. Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, No. A-90-CA-925 (W.D. Tex. filed Oct. 30,
1990); Wise, 758 F. Supp. at 1414; FSLIC v. Lensing, Gravel, Rosenzweig, Christen & LeBeau, No.
89-329 (M.D. La. filed Apr. 28, 1989); and FSLIC v. Vineyard, No. CA5-87-124 (N.IS. Tex. filed
June 17, 1987).
47. See, e.g., FDIC v. Shrader & York, No. H-91-1372 (S.D. Tex. filed May 17, 1991) (attorneys
allegedly acted as borrowers in transaction designed to disguise loss for another client); FDIC v.
Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, No. A-90-CA-925 (W.D. Tex. filed Oct. 30, 1990) (firm represented
both thrift and its service company); FDIC v. Martin, No-90-409-CIV-T-17B (M.D. Fla. filed Apr.
6, 1990) (firm simultaneously represented thrift and borrowers); FDIC v. Bauman, No. CA3-90-614-
H (N.D. Tex. filed Mar. 19, 1990) (firm simultaneously represented sole shareholder of thrift, thrift,
and holding company); and FDIC v. Vaughn, No. CA3-90-1282-D (N.D. Tex. filed June 4, 1990)
(attorneys and related entities allegedly received nearly $55 million in loans from thrift at the same
time that they were representing thrift).
48. See, e.g., FDIC v. Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, No. A-90-CA-925 (W.D. Tex. filed Oct. 30,
1990); FDIC v. Wise, No. 90-F-1688 (D. Colo. filed Sept. 21, 1990); and FDIC v. Martin, No-90-
408-CIV-T-17B (M.D. Fla. filed Apr. 6, 1990).
49. For example, the FDIC has alleged that thrift counsel in one case failed to protect deposi-
tors after the lawyers knew of misconduct within the entity. Complaint at 21, FDIC v. Bauman, No.
CA3-90-614-H (N.D. Tex. filed March 19, 1990). In another case, the FDIC has alleged that the
firm aided and abetted breaches of fiduciary duty by actors within the thrift by "failing to disclose or
misrepresenting to federal regulators facts concerning the [savings and loan] associations." Com-
plaint at 52, FDIC v. Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, No. A-90-CA-925 (W.D. Tex. filed Oct. 30,
1990).
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approaches insolvency. 0 Although the FDIC has not embraced that
theory fully, at least one representative of the agency believes that thrift
counsel are obligated to disclose certain information to regulators."1
The fact patterns in these suits bring the problems of entity repre-
sentation into sharp relief. Unfortunately, as the next section indicates,
the ethical codes provide little assistance in resolving those problems.
III. REPRESENTATION OF ENTITIEs AND DISCLOSURE OF
WRONGDOING UNDER THE ETHICAL CODES
In the typical conception of the attorney-client relationship, an indi-
vidual retains an attorney to resolve a discrete problem, usually through
litigation. The earliest codes of ethics reflected that paradigm, despite
the myriad changes that had already occurred in legal services. Even the
present ethical codification of choice, the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct (Model Rules),52 preserves older notions of the professional re-
lationship while recognizing some modem problems.
A. The Canons of Professional Conduct
The American Bar Association (ABA) first attempted to develop
national ethical standards in 1908, by adopting the Canons of Profes-
sional Conduct (1908 Canons).53 The bar drew the 1908 Canons largely
50. Harris Weinstein, Remarks at Southern Methodist University 5 (Sept. 13, 1990) (text on file
with the Author). For a report of his remarks, see 55 Banking Rep. (BNA) 508 (Sept. 24, 1990).
Bank and thrift attorneys subsequently criticized Weinstein's view. See 55 Banking Rep. (BNA) 547
(Oct. 1, 1990).
51. [IThe legal division of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation has not embraced
the view ... thus far articulated by Harris Weinstein.
[But wle think it appropriate to assert a duty owed to the regulators who need, in
their examinations, to rely upon the quality of the institution's financial information. I
don't think it's an unreasonable burden to expect those who have relevant data affecting
the financial condition of an institution to disclose those data.
55 Banking Rep. (BNA) 941 (Dec. 10, 1990) (interview with Al Byrne, General Counsel, FDIC).
52. As of December 19, 1990, thirty-nine states had adopted the Model Rules in some form, and
ten states still retained the Model Code. California has never adopted either the Model Code or
Model Rules. 1 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, LAWYER'S MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
(BNA) 1:3-4 (1990) [hereinafter ABA/BNA MANUAL].
53. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1908) [hereinafter
1908 CANONS]. The original thirty-two canons were amended and supplemented beginning in 1928.
See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, OPINIONS OF THE COMMITrEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND
GRIEVANCEs at ix (1957). Ultimately, there were forty-seven canons before the adoption of the
Model Code. For convenience, the original canons, additions, and amendments, will be collectively
referred to as the 1908 CANONS.
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from an ethics code Alabama adopted in 1887,11 a code based on the
published lectures of a jurist in the mid-nineteenth century." The 1908
Canons exalted the view of law practice as a discreet matter between
gentlemen. Whether that view was accurate is questionable. The Ca-
nons' genteel view probably resulted from the alchemy of memory, or
from the desire of the ABA to glorify the profession, 6 rather than from a
dispassionate assessment of the bar at the time.
1. Entity Representation Under the 1908 Canons. The original
1908 Canons focused on trial practice, and emphasized the relationships
between lawyers and clients, and among lawyers, rather than focusing on
any broader sense of the responsibility of the bar. 7 They scarcely men-
tioned representation of organizations; any references they did contain
were merely cursory. None of the Canons were directed to the particular
problems of organizational lawyers.
Canon 32 briefly mentioned that the lawyer should disregard the
wishes of clients, individual and corporate, if those wishes conflicted with
the lawyer's role as an officer of the court. The thrust of the canon was
the lawyer's general duties to the system, not the special problems of
entity representation. Canon 35 provided that organizations could hire
54. Alabama State Bar Association, Code of Ethics (1887), reprinted in HENRY S. DRINKER,
LEGAL ETHICS 352 (1953).
55. G. SHARswooD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1854), reprinted in 32 ABA REP. 1
(1907)). The Alabama Code of Ethics was also derived from resolutions written by a Maryland
practitioner, David Hoffman, earlier in the nineteenth century. See David Hoffman, Hoffman's Fifty
Resolutions in Regard to Professional Deportment, reprinted in DRINKER, supra note 54, at 338.
56. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 2.6.2 (1986). Professor Wolfram con-
tends that the ABA, which included a proportionally small number of lawyers, wished to enhance
the stature of American lawyers by promulgating national ethical standards.
57. The canons of ethics put dominant emphasis on the lawyer-client and lawyer-lawyer
relationships. Their next most striking emphasis was the overwhelming extent to which
they focused on situations arising out of litigation .... Litigation held a decreasing rela-
tive, if not absolute, position in lawyers' business, compared with matters of office coun-
seling and compared with lawyers' relations to legislative, executive, and administrative
bodies. Despite this shift in the direction of law practice, the formal thinking of the
profession about its ethical problems clung to the early nineteenth-century stereotype of
the lawyer as advocate. It had little to say - and that in most uninformative generalities
- about the main currents of law practice as these took direction after 1870.
JAMES WILLARD HuRsT, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW 331 (1950).
58. The text of the canon read, in part:
No client, corporate or individual, however powerful, nor any cause, civil or political,
however important, is entitled to receive nor should any lawyer render any service or
advice involving disloyalty to the law whose ministers we are, or disrespect of the judi-
cial office, which we are bound to uphold, or corruption of any person or persons exer-
cising a public office or private trust, or deception or betrayal of the public. When
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attorneys to act for them "in any matter in which the organization, as an
entity, is interested, but this employment should not include the render-
ing of legal services to the members of such an organization in respect to
their individual affairs.' 5 9 The main point of Canon 35 was to require
that lawyers work directly with clients, not to address entity representa-
tions in particular.
The principal articulation of the entity notion during the reign of the
1908 Canons came from ethics opinions rather than the canons them-
selves."° The ABA's ethics opinions regarding entity issues, few in
number at the outset,61 have been nearly as feckless in guiding the entity
lawyer as the ethical codes on which they were putatively based. One
early ethics decision rendered under the 1908 Canons articulated the no-
tion of the entity as client. An attorney sought an opinion whether the
general counsel of a corporation could properly solicit proxies from
stockholders on behalf of one group in a fight for management control.
In responding negatively to the question, the committee said, "[tihe cli-
ent of the general counsel of the corporation is the corporation itself..
[The lawyer] is acting as the corporation's attorney only and not as the
attorney of any of its stockholders, directors or officers as individuals, or
any group or faction thereof."'62 The authority for this proposition is
unclear since the 1908 Canons did not explicitly provide it.
In another of its rare corporate-related opinions, the ethics commit-
tee recognized the role of corporate managers, but still did not answer
important questions. In an informal opinion in 1968, the committee con-
cluded that a corporate attorney could advise the corporate president
how to defeat an attempt by minority shareholders to gain control of the
rendering any such improper service or advice, the lawyer invites and merits stem and
just condemnation.
1908 CANONS, supra note 53, No. 32.
59. 1908 CANONS, supra note 53, No. 35.
60. In 1922, the ABA authorized a pre-existing standing committee to interpret the ethical
rules. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal and Informal Ethics Opin-
ions 1 (1985). The Committee was known for a time as the.Committee on Professional Ethics and
Grievances and the Committee on Professional Ethics, but has been known since 1971 as the Com-
mittee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility. Id. at 2. The task of the Committee is "to formu-
late opinions of general application, or to render advisory opinions where a lawyer is in doubt
contemplated action would be ethical." ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 649
(1963).
61. Only two percent or less of the formal and informal opinions of the Committee on Profes-
sional Ethics between 1908 and 1973 dealt with corporate practice. Carl A. Pierce, The Code of
Professional Responsibility in the Corporate World: An Abdication of Professional Self-Regulation, 6
U. MICH. J.L. REF. 350, 354 n.21 (1973).
62. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 86 (1932).
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board of directors.63 The committee said,
[A] corporation can function only through activities of those individuals
who as directors shape and determine policies and make major decisions for
the corporation and those individuals who as officers conduct its affairs and
operations.... In acting as counsel for a corporation a lawyer not only
may but should give legal advice to its officers in all matters relating to the
corporation as long as they are in office, except in situations where to his
knowledge the interests of the officers are adverse to the interests of the
corporation and the giving of the advice would be contrary to the interestsof the corporation. 6
The committee still begged the question. Although it stated that the
attorney was entitled to rely on management unless he or she knew the
rendition of advice would be contrary to the interests of the corporation,
it offered no guidance to the attorney who has to decide when he or she
has reached that juncture. Nor did it advise the attorney how to identify
the corporation's interests.
The opinion also conflicted with the earlier Formal Opinion 86, ren-
dered in 1932, in which the committee had found it improper for the
corporate general counsel to solicit proxies in the midst of a proxy
fight.65 One could argue that the facts in Formal Opinion 86 are distin-
guishable from the later Informal Opinion 1056. In Formal Opinion 86,
corporate counsel was actively participating in proxy solicitation, rather
than responding to a request for advice from the corporation, acting
through its directors, as did the attorney in Informal Opinion 1056. But
it is difficult to say with the same glib presumptuousness that character-
izes Informal Opinion 1056 that the directors seeking advice in that case
were acting purely from a desire to protect the corporation. The direc-
63. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 1056 (1968).
64. Id.
65. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 86 (1932). The committee
said:
... Mhe client of the general counsel of a corporation is the corporation itself. As a
corporation speaks and acts only through its officers and directors, its counsel is their
legal advisor in respect to its affairs, but in performing that duty he is acting as the
corporation's attorney only and not as the attorney of any of its stockholders, directors
or officers as individuals, or any group or faction thereof.
In acting as the corporation's legal adviser he must refrain from taking part in any
controversies or factional differences which may exist among stockholders as to its con-
trol. When his opinion is sought by those entitled to it, or when it becomes his duty to
voice it, he must be in portion to give it without bias or prejudice and to have it recog-
nized as being so given. Unless he is in that position his usefulness to his client is
impaired.
In the case of conflict between a formal opinion and a later informal opinion, the formal opinion
controls. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 317 (1967).
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tors obviously had a strong personal interest in the outcome of the fight
with minority stockholders.
In effect, the ethics committee in Informal Opinion 1056 permitted
the corporate counsel to offer advice to one of the constituent groups,
while still pledging allegiance to the entity-as-client notion. The commit-
tee again tossed the underlying question - defining the corporation's
best interests - squarely back in the attorney's lap.
2. Disclosure of Client Wrongs Under the 1908 Canons. The 1908
Canons protected client confidences in Canon 37: "[i]t is the duty of a
lawyer to preserve his client's confidences. This duty outlasts the law-
yer's employment, and extends as well to his employees ... ."66 Canon
37 created exceptions to this duty for responding to the client's accusa-
tions and the client's announced intention to commit a crime. 7
Canon 29 suggested that a lawyer should disclose perjury occurring
during a trial to the prosecutor, although the canon did not distinguish
between the perjury of clients and the perjury of other witnesses. 6 Ca-
non 41 also mandated disclosure of information if a lawyer discovered
"some fraud or deception has been practiced, which has unjustly im-
posed upon the court or a party"'69 and the client refused to rectify it.
But the Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances opined in
1953 that Canon 37, the general confidentiality rule, controlled Canon
41.70 Accordingly, a lawyer could not ethically reveal to a court the cli-
ent's perjury occurring during the representation. The lawyer should at-
tempt to convince the client to tell the truth, but could only withdraw if
the client refused to do so.
66. 1908 CANONS, supra note 53, No. 37.
67. If a lawyer is accused by his client, he is not precluded from disclosing the truth in
respect to the accusation. The announced intention of a client to commit a crime is not
included within the confidences which he is bound to respect. He may properly make
such disclosures as may be necessary to prevent the act or protect those against whom it
is threatened.
1908 CANONS, supra note 53, No. 37.
68. Canon 29 said, in part, "[t]he counsel upon trial of a cause in which perjury has been com-
mitted owe it to the profession and to the public to bring the matter to the knowledge of the prose-
cuting authorities." 1908 CANONS, supra note 53, No. 29.
69. 1908 Canons, supra note 53, No. 41, which reads in full:
When a lawyer discovers that some fraud or deception has been practiced, which has
unjustly imposed upon the court or a party, he should endeavor to rectify it; at first by
advising his client, and if his client refuses to forego the advantage thus unjustly gained,
he should promptly inform the injured person or his counsel, so they may take appropri-
ate steps.
1908 CANONS, supra note 53, No. 41.
70. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 287 (1953).
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The committee dealt with the issue of misconduct by a corporate
actor in Formal Opinion 202.71 In that case, a manager of a trust com-
pany embezzled funds belonging to trust beneficiaries. Recognizing its
liability for the defalcations of its employee, the trust company proposed
to purchase the outstanding beneficial interests of the trust beneficiaries
in order to eliminate its liability. The company's attorney approved this
plan with the caveat that the company first disclose the embezzlement to
the beneficiaries. The company disregarded his advice and completed the
transaction without making the suggested disclosure.
The committee concluded that the trust company attorney could
disclose the entire situation to the board of directors, but not to others
because of the confidentiality rule of Canon 37. The committee looked
only to Canon 37 for an exception to confidentiality, saying that disclo-
sure might have been appropriate if the attorney had learned in advance
of the trust company's nondisclosure to the trust beneficiaries and that
nondisclosure was also a crime. Oddly, the committee never mentioned
Canon 41, which dealt directly with the imposition of a fraud by the
client. Further, the committee did not say what the attorney should have
done if the board of directors did not try to rectify the fraud, although
Canon 16 suggested that a lawyer should withdraw ifa client persisted in
improper conduct.
B. The Model Code of Professional Responsibility
1. Entity Representation Under the Model Code. The 1908 Canons
were amended several times,72 but the deficiencies of the rules were too
widespread to be resolved by intermittent amendment. 73 Eventually, the
committee assigned to study the subject74 developed the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility (Model Code), which the bar adopted in 1969.7s
The Model Code improves upon the 1908 Canons in many respects, but
71. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 202 (1940).
72. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, OPINIONS OF THE COMMITrEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS
AND GRIEVANCES at ix (1957).
73. ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON EVALUATION OF ETHICAL STANDARDS, CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Preface at vi (Preliminary Draft, January 15, 1969).
74. The House of Delegates to the ABA created the Special Committee on Evaluation of Ethical
Standards in 1964 at the behest of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., then president of the ABA. Id. at v.
75. By 1974, every state except California had either officially adopted or unofficially approved
the Model Code. WOLFRAM, supra note 56, § 2.6.3. The general deficiencies of the 1908 Canons
and the structure of the Model Code are described in John F. Sutton, Jr., The American BarAssocla-
tion Code of Professional Responsibility: An Introduction, 48 TEx. L. REv. 255 (1970). The word
"Model" was added to the title of the document in 1978 following a settlement with the Justice
Department over antitrust allegations. WOLFRAM, supra note 56, § 2.6.3.
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still pays insufficient attention to the problems of entity lawyers. The
principal guidance to an entity lawyer under the Model Code resides in
an Ethical Consideration,76 which states, "[a] lawyer employed or re-
tained by a corporation or similar entity owes his allegiance to the entity
and not to a stockholder, director, officer, employee, representative, or
other person connected with the entity."
77
In its preliminary forms, EC 5-18 was narrower in scope and was
directed toward in-house counsel. For example, the earliest draft of the
provision said, "[a] lawyer employed as such on a salaried basis by an
entity, regardless of its type, is in a position distinct from that of other
lawyers. His allegiance is owed to the entity .... ',78 Eventually the
drafters broadened the provision to include any attorney "employed or
retained by an entity."1
79
The drafters rigidly adhered to the notion that the true client was
the entity alone, even to the point of removing token recognition of the
essential role of entity representatives. The preliminary and tentative
drafts had contained the provision that "[i]n advising an entity through a
stockholder, director, employee, or representative, [the attorney] should
keep paramount its interests .... "I' But the drafters deleted most of the
first clause, which had recognized, at least implicitly, that entities cannot
act except through representatives. As a result, the provision has an arti-
ficial air. It perpetuates the image of the entity client as a sterile and
inanimate monolith. The reality of entity representations is quite
different.81
76. The Model Code is organized into nine canons. A canon is a general statement of obliga-
tion, such as, "[a] lawyer should exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of a client."
MODEL CODE, supra note 7, at 5. Under each canon, the Model Code contains Ethical Considera-
tions (ECs) and Disciplinary Rules (DRs). The ECs are "aspirational in character and represent the
objectives toward which every member of the profession should strive. They constitute a body of
principles upon which the lawyer can rely for guidance in many specific situations." MODEL CODE,
supra note 7, Preliminary Statement. The DRs provide the minimal standards for attorney behavior.
Although a lawyer can be disciplined only for violation of a DR, a few courts have viewed the ECs
as binding. WOLFRAM, supra note 56, at § 2.6.3.
77. MODEL CODE, supra note 7, EC 5-18.
78. ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON EVALUATION OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC VI-17 (Tentative Draft, October 1968) [hereinafter cited as MODEL
CODE TENTATIVE DRAFT]. The Model Code Tentative Draft of this canon is excerpted and dis-
cussed in AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, ANNOTATED CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
224 (1979).
79. MODEL CODE, supra note 7, EC 5-18.
80. MODEL CODE TENTATIVE DRAFT, supra note 78, EC VI-17 (emphasis added).
81. In the words of Professor Charles Wolfram, "[tihe answers to the question of relationship
given in the lawyer codes tend to be pat and satisfyingly high-minded but insufficient in dealing with
the complex texture of real corporate life." WOLFRAM, supra note 56, § 13.7.2. Professor Geoffrey
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2. Disclosure of Client Wrongs Under the Model Code. The Model
Code permits far more disclosure of client confidences than its predeces-
sor or successor. The Model Code obligates the lawyer not to disclose
either "confidences" or "secrets." 2 It defines the former as information
protected under the attorney-client privilege, and the latter as other in-
formation that the client disclosed in confidence or that would be embar-
rassing or damaging to the client if revealed. 3 The Model Code permits
attorneys to reveal the client's intention to commit a crime, and confiden-
tial information if permitted by other ethical rules.
8 4
Another rule in the Model Code requires an attorney to reveal a
client fraud to the defrauded person if the fraud occurred during the rep-
resentation and the client cannot or will not rectify the fraud. 85 This
rule, DR 7-102(B)(1), does not require such disclosure if the information
is "protected as a privileged communication." The ABA added the ex-
ception in 1974, but not all the states using the Model Code adopted the
change.8 6 The exception, which refers to "privileged communication,"
could have been interpreted as forbidding disclosure of only "confi-
dences," since the Model Code defines that term as information pro-
tected by the attorney-client privilege. But in a later ethics opinion, the
ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility held that the
term "privileged communication" refers to both confidences and
secrets.8 7 If that interpretation is correct, then the exception to DR 7-
102(B)(1) vitiates the rule. But the general rule of confidentiality, DR 4-
101(C), still permits an attorney to disclose a client's intention to commit
a crime. Even under the enervated version of DR 7-102(B)(1), an attor-
ney still may disclose fraudulent conduct so long as it would also consti-
tute a future crime.
Hazard has also noted the evasiveness of EC 5-18, since it does not guide the attorney during the
critical times of conflicts within an entity. See, eg., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., ETHICS IN THE
PRACTICE OF LAW, 46 (1978) (Professor Hazard has also noted the evasiveness of EC 5-18, since it
does not guide the attorney during the critical times of conflicts within an entity). For further
criticism of the Model Code and its treatment of corporations, in particular, see Pierce, supra note
61.
82. MODEL CODE, supra note 7, DR 4-101(B).
83. Id. DR 4-101(A).
84. Id. DR 4-101(Q.
85. Id DR 7-102(B)(1).
86. As of 1974, forty-nine states had officially or unofficially adopted the Model Code. WOLF-
RAM, supra note 56, § 2.6.3. Of those states, thirty-eight did not adopt the 1974 amendment and
therefore still required an attorney to rectify client fraud. See Robert A. Burt, 69 GEO. L.J. 1015,
1017 n.14 (1981).
87. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 341 (1975).
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C. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct
1. Entity Representation Under the Model Rules. After only a few
years, the criticism of the Model Code was intense.88 In 1977, the ABA
formed the Kutak Commission to examine the Model Code and suggest
revision or reformulation. The Commission decided that a completely
new set of rules was necessary, rather than a revision of the Model
Code.89 The Commission proposed the Model Rules, which the House
of Delegates approved in 1983.90
The Kutak Commission submitted its first Discussion Draft of the
Model Rules in 1980.91 In response to criticism that the Model Code
ignored substantial practice areas outside litigation, the Commission
drafted special rules for government and organization lawyers92 and em-
phasized the various roles of the attorney, such as advisor 93 and inter-
mediary.94 During the drafting and discussion process, some critics
suggested that the Model Rules should adopt a "group theory" of organi-
zational representation. That is, the lawyer for an organization should be
"regarded as acting on behalf of a group of individuals who are associ-
ated with each other in an organization."9 Under this view, organiza-
tional representation would be a species of joint representation.96 But the
88. See, e.g., Reflections on a Decade Under the Code ofProfessional Responsibility: The Need for
Reform, 57 N.C. L. REv. 495 (1979); L. Roy Patterson, Wanted: A New Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility, 63 A.B.A. J. 639 (1977).
89. Not everyone shared that view. For example, the National Organization of Bar Counsel
strongly objected to the abandonment of the Model Code, and offered its own revisions. See NA-
TIONAL ORGANIZATION OF BAR COUNSEL, REPORT ON A STUDY OF THE PROPOSED ABA MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT WITH RECOMMENDATIONS (1980). For a brief history of the
drafting of the Model Rules, see Walter P. Armstrong, The Kutak Commission Report: Retrospect
and Prospect, 11 CAP. U. L. REv. 475 (1982).
90. The elaborate structure of the Model Code was often criticized, so the Model Rules are
arranged in a different fashion. Instead of the tripartite organization of Canons, ECs, and DRs, the
Model Rules consist of mandatory rules and explanatory comments. "The Comment accompanying
each Rule explains and illustrates the meaning and purpose of the Rule.... The Comments are
intended as guides to interpretation, but the text of each Rule is authoritative." MODEL RULES,
supra note 7, Preamble, Scope and Terminology.
91. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (Discussion Draft 1980) [hereinafter MODEL
RULES DISCUSSION DRAFT].
92. MODEL RuLEs, supra note 7, Rule 1.11 (government lawyer), and id., Rule 1.13 (organiza-
tion as the client).
93. Id. Rule 2.1.
94. Id Rule 2.2.
95. 1 GEOFFREY HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING 391-92 (2d
ed. 1990).
96. The Roscoe Pound-American Trial Lawyers Foundation (ATLF) proposed its own code in
1980. AMERICAN TRIAL LAWYERS FOUNDATION, THE AMERICAN LAWYER'S CODE OF CONDUCT
(Public Discussion Draft, June 1980) [hereinafter ATLF CODE). Rule 2.5 views the board of direc-
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Kutak Commission remained faithful to the notion of the entity as the
client. It changed slightly the section of the rule dealing with client iden-
tity. Ultimately, Model Rule 1.13 provided that an attorney representing
an organization "represents the organization acting through its duly au-
thorized constituents.
'97
2. Disclosure of Client Wrongs Under the Model Rules. Perhaps
the largest single source of controversy within Model Rule 1.13, as origi-
nally proposed, was a provision that would have permitted disclosure
tots as the true client. The ATLF Code admonishes the attorney to inform the board of conflicts
that might arise among constituent groups.
97. MODEL RULES, supra note 7, Rule 1.13(a).
The full text of the rule is as follows:
Rule 1.13 Organization as Client
(a) A lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the organization
acting through its duly authorized constituents.
(b) If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer, employee, or other person
associated with the organization is engaged in action, intends to act or refuses to act in a
matter related to the representation that is a violation of a legal obligation to the organi-
zation, or a violation of law which reasonably might be imputed to the organization, and
is likely to result in substantial injury to the organization, the lawyer shall proceed as is
reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization. In determining how to
proceed, the lawyer shall give due consideration to the seriousness of the violation and
its consequences, the scope and nature of the lawyer's representation, the responsibility
in the organization and the apparent motivation of the person involved, the policies of
the organization concerning such matters and any other relevant considerations. Any
measures taken shall be designed to minimize disruption of the organization and the risk
of revealing information relating to the representation to person outside the organiza-
tion. Such measures may include among others:
(1) asking reconsideration of the matter;
(2) advising that a separate legal opinion on the matter be sought for presentation
to appropriate authority in the organization; and
(3) referring the matter to higher authority in the organization, including, if war-
ranted by the seriousness of the matter, referral to the highest authority that
can act in behalf of the organization as determined by applicable law.
(c) If, despite the lawyer's efforts in accordance with paragraph (b), the highest au-
thority that can act on behalf of the organization insists upon action, or a refusal to act,
that is clearly a violation of law and is likely to result in substantial injury to the organi-
zation, the lawyer may resign in accordance with Rule 1.16.
(d) In dealing with an organization's directors, officers, employees, members, share-
holders, or other constituents, a lawyer shall explain the identity of the client when it is
apparent that the organization's interests are adverse to those of the constituents with
whom the lawyer is dealing.
(e) A lawyer representing an organization may also represent any of its directors,
officers, employees, members, shareholders, or other constituents, subject to the provi-
sions of Rule 1.7 [the general conflicts of interest rule]. If the organization's consent to
the dual representation is required by Rule 1.7, the consent shall be given by an appro-
priate official of the organization other than the individual who is to be represented, or
by the shareholders.
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outside the entity under some circumstances. If an attorney knew of a
clear legal violation that was "likely to result in significant injury to the
organization"98 and the highest governing authority of the organization
refused to remedy the situation, the lawyer had the discretion to disclose
the information outside the organization if disclosure was in the organi-
zation's best interests. The attorney could reveal the information to
members, shareholders, or public authorities.99 Critical reaction was
swift and indignant."° Eventually, the bar changed the rule to permit
withdrawal from the representation, rather than disclosure, as the law-
yer's last resort.10t
Other provisions of the Model Rules also discuss the issue of an
attorney's discretionary or mandatory duties to disclose client wrongs.
Model Rule 1.6,102 which defines the general ethical duty of confidential-
ity, prohibits disclosure of information relating to the representation'0 3
98. MODEL RULES DISCUSSION DRAFr, supra note 91, Rule 1.13(c).
99. Id. at Rule 1.13. The Commission's concern with disclosure of wrongdoing was the out-
growth of several highly publicized cases in the 1970s. In cases such as SEC v. National Student
Marketing Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978), the SEC alleged that securities lawyers had a
duty to disclose to regulators securities violations committed by their clients. The SEC filed the case
in 1972. The complaint is reprinted in [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCil)
93,360.
100. In the foreword to the public discussion draft of the ATLF Code, the authors sniffed,
"[t]he proponents of an alternative to this Code have apparently forgotten that [our system of justice
is an adversary one]. Their most recent draft would erode basic constitutional protections by making
the lawyer the agent of the state, not the champion of the client, in many important respects." ATLF
CODE, supra note 98, at iii. See also Monroe H. Freedman, Lawyer.Client Confidences The Model
Rules" Radical Assault on Tradition, 68 A.B.A. . 428 (1982) (the traditional strict protection of
lawyer-client confidences is necessary to maintain the traditional relationship between lawyer and
client).
101. See supra note 97 for the full text of the rule as adopted.
102. MODEL RULES, supra note 7, Rule 1.6, which provides:
Rule 1.6 Confidentiality of Information
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a client
unless the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures that are impliedly
authorized in order to carry out the representation, and except as stated in paragraph
(b).
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer reasonably be-
lieves necessary:
(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is
likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm; or
(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between
the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil
claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved,
or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's repre-
sentation of the client.
103. See also MODEL CODE, supra note 7, DR 4-101(B) (prohibiting disclosure of "confidences"
or "secrets"). The Model Code defined confidences as information protected by the attorney-client
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except in limited circumstances. The Model Rules' exceptions to confi-
dentiality are narrower than the Model Code's exceptions. The Model
Code permits disclosure of a client's intention to commit any crime, not
just those involving serious bodily harm.1" And the Model Code, before
the 1974 amendment, seemingly mandated disclosure of client crime or
fraud occurring during the representation if the client could not or would
not rectify his or her conduct. 105
The Model Rules, in contrast, do not contain any parallel provision
for disclosure of client fraud. Professor Geoffrey Hazard, however, ar-
gues strongly that the second express exception to confidentiality - "to
establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer
based upon conduct in which the client was involved" 106 - permits an
attorney to disclose client wrongdoing if the attorney fears being charged
with complicity. 7
Curiously, Model Rule 1.6 does not contain exceptions for disclo-
sures needed to comply with other rules, or other law, although earlier
forms of the rule did so.108 For example, the rule itself does not contain
an exception for an attorney who has been ordered to testify over claims
of attorney-client pivilege. The comment to the rule suggests that dis-
closure under these circumstances is permitted.109 But the comments to
the rules are not authoritative. 110 That the ABA House of Delegates
would have relegated such an important exception to a non-binding com-
privilege, and secrets as information that the client has requested be kept confidential, or that would
be embarrassing or detrimental to the client if revealed. MODEL CODE, supra note 7, DR 4-101(A).
104. MODEL CODE, supra note 7, DR 4-101(C)(3).
105. Id. DR 7-102(B)(1), which provides:
(B) A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that:
(1) His client has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a
person or tribunal shall promptly call upon his client to rectify the same, and if
his client refuses or is unable to do so, he shall reveal the fraud to the affected
person or tribunal, except when the information is protected as a privileged
communication.
106. MODEL RULES, supra note 7, Rule 1.6(b)(2).
107. 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 95, at 143-45, 174-75. But see MONROE H. FREEDMAN,
UNDERSTANDING LAwYERS' ETHics 105 (1990) (stating that Model Rule 1.6(b)(2) requires that
charges be pending against the attorney).
108. MODEL RULES DisCUSSION DRAFr, supra note 91, Rule 1.7(c) (permitting disclosure to
serve the client's interests, to prevent or rectify the client's wrongful acts, to establish claims or
defenses of the lawyer in disputes with the client, or to comply with law or other rules of professional
conduct).
109. "The lawyer must comply with the final orders of a court or other tribunal of competent
jurisdiction requiring the lawyer to give information about the client." MODEL RULES, supra note 7,
Rule 1.6 cmt.
110. Id. Preamble, Scope and Terminology.
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ment is quite curious, unless the delegates understood and desired that
the comments would be viewed as binding.'11
Model Rule 4.1 is also relevant because it mandates that a lawyer
disclose material facts to a third person when disclosure is necessary to
avoid assisting in a client crime or fraud. 1 2 But this mandatory duty is
limited by the general rule of confidentiality. That limitation nullifies the
rule, unless one reads into Rule 1.6 an implied exception for disclosure of
client fraud as Professor Hazard suggests, or at least views the text of
Rule 1.6 as only a partial list of exceptions."
3
IV. ENTITY REPRESENTATION IN THE COURTS
Although the current ethical codes steadfastly adhere to the entity
theory of organizational representation, a review of court decisions con-
cerning conflicts of interest reveals limited adherence to the theory.
Cases involving close corporations are particularly salient. Further,
trends in other areas of the law suggest some changes in the traditional
view of the organizational client. When an attorney challenged for a
conflict of interest has represented a close corporation, several courts
have followed the traditional rule that the attorney represents the entity
alone." 4 But a few other courts have been quite willing to look beyond
111. The comment to Rule 1.6 also refers to Rules 2.2 (lawyer acting as intermediary between
clients), 2.3 (lawyer preparing evaluation, such an opinion letter, for use by a third party), 3.3 (law-
yer behaving candidly toward court), and 4.1 (lawyer acting truthfully toward others).
112. MODEL RuLES, supra note 7, Rule 4.1 which provides:
Rule 4.1 Truthfulness in Statements to Others
In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly:
(a) make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person; or
(b) fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure is necessary to
avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless disclosure is prohibited
by Rule 1.6.
The quoted language is similar to the rule establishing the scope of legal representation, which
prohibits a lawyer from knowingly assisting a client's crime or fraud. Ia Rule 1.2(d). Moreover,
attorney-client communications made in furtherance of a crime or fraud are not protected by the
evidentiary privilege of confidentiality. WOLFRAM, supra note 56, § 6.4.10.
113. 2 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 95, at 720-23.
114. See, eg., Orchard v. Covelli, 590 F. Supp. 1548 (W.D. Pa. 1984) (attorney for closely-held
corporation not liable to minority shareholder for participating in breach of fiduciary duty by major-
ity shareholder since attorney acted in response to requests of the corporation); Bobbitt v. Victorian
House, Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1124 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (attorney for closely-held corporation did not repre-
sent individual director-shareholder); Mullaney, Wells & Co. v. Savage, 402 N.E.2d 574 (Ill. 1980)
(prior representation of corporation owned by defendants did not preclude later representation of
plaintiff in suit against defendants); Felty v. Hartweg, 523 N.E.2d 555, 556 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) ("A
shareholder in an ordinary corporation does not thereby become a beneficiary of an attorney-client
relationship between a lawyer and the corporation in which he owns shares."); Terre du Lac Prop-
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the corporate fiction that supports the entity theory. One of the earliest
cases to ignore the corporate entity was Seifert v. Dumatic Industries,
Inc., 15 in which Seifert, a fifty percent stockholder in Dumatic Indus-
tries, sued the corporation and the remaining stockholder derivatively.
Seifert charged the other stockholder, Globe Ticket Company, with
breach of the Dumatic incorporation agreement. Seifert's counsel also
represented the corporation. Globe moved to disqualify the corporate
counsel from representing Seifert in the derivative suit. The court cited
the general rule against conflicts of interest,116 but concluded that no
interest of the corporation conflicted with Seifert's position in the deriva-
tive suit. The court ignored the corporate form and viewed the suit
merely as an action for breach of contract between Seifert and Globe.
11 7
Similarly, in another case,' 8 the court looked at the stock owner-
ship and management of two corporate defendants when the plaintiff
sought to disqualify their counsel. The corporations were the third- and
fourth-party defendants in a construction dispute. One of the corpora-
tions had impleaded the other, and the same attorney represented both
companies. Three members of the same family owned the capital stock
of both companies, and the companies shared the same officers, substan-
tially the same directors and shareholders, and the same office space and
employees. Due to the "substantial identity of interests" 119 between the
corporations, the court held that no conflict of interest existed. Of more
recent cases involving close corporations, the Oregon Supreme Court,
has moved the farthest away from the entity theory. In a disciplinary
proceeding against two lawyers, Banks and Thompson, the Oregon State
Bar charged the attorneys with a conflict of interest in their representa-
tion of a closely-held business.120 Banks, Thompson, and their firm rep-
erty Owners' Ass'n v. Shrum, 661 S.W.2d 45 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (attorney for closely-held corpora-
tion was permitted to sue corporation's principal shareholder as an individual).
115. 197 A.2d 454 (Pa. 1964).
116. At the time, the 1908 Canons were in effect. The court cited Canon 6, which reads in part:
It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of this canon, a
lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to
contend for that which duty to another client requires him to oppose.
197 A.2d at 455 (quoting 1908 CANONS, supra note 53, Canon No. 6).
117. 197 A.2d at 456. Cf. Torres v. Divis, 494 N.E.2d 1227 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (interests of
incorporators of closely-held business often conflict). But see Lowder v. All Star Mills, Inc., 309
S.E.2d 193 (N.C. 1983) (holding that who plaintiffs were suing derivatively did not make their inter-
ests identical to the interests of the corporations on whose behalf they sued).
118. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Daniel Int'l Corp., 563 F.2d 671 (5th Cir. 1977).
!19. Id. at 673.
120. In re Banks, 584 P.2d 284 (Or. 1978).
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resented United Medical Laboratories (UML), which was owned and
controlled by R. S. Michel, his wife, and their two daughters. The Michel
family owned all the stock and the four family members comprised the
board of directors. Thompson also drafted Michel's will and his employ-
ment contract with UML.
After a period of great growth, the company began experiencing fi-
nancial problems, and a serious family dispute erupted. Mrs. Michel and
her daughters placed their stock in a voting trust and elected a new board
of directors. The new board briefly ousted Michel from control of the
company, and Michel refused to cooperate with the board in resolving a
dispute with one of the company's lenders. Banks opined to the board
that Michel's actions were a breach of his employment agreement, which
Thompson had drafted. Eventually, the family sold the company. The
new owners rehired Michel and he promptly fired Banks, Thompson, and
many employees. Some of those employees founded a new company to
compete with UML, and Banks and Thompson then began representing
the new competitor.
The Oregon Supreme Court formally reprimanded the attorneys for
conflicts of interest. Although the court claimed allegiance to the entity
theory, it decided that the corporate entity should be disregarded for
conflict purposes when the corporation is closely held. And, signifi-
cantly, the court focused on the actors within the entity.
In weighing the interest of the corporation and the desirability of avoiding
conflicts of interest, it seems to us that the balance should be struck the
other way in closely held family corporations where the operator, of the
corporation either owns or controls the stock in such a manner that it is
reasonable to assume that there is no real reason for him to differentiate in
his mind between his own and corporate interests. In such a situation all the
reasons are in existence which give rise to the rule against conflicts of inter-
est because there is no basis for the individual to believe that the attorney
has or ever will have other than his individual interests at heart. It is our
conclusion that the only ethical position for an attorney to adopt when sub-
stantially identical interests which he has represented become divergent is
to represent neither the individual nor the corporation.
121
The court concluded that the firm represented both Michel and the
corporation when it drafted Michel's employment contract and therefore
could not represent either party in a later dispute over the contract with-
out the consent of both. Further because of Michel's prior identity of
interest with the corporation, it was also improper for the attorneys to
121. 584 P.2d at 292 (footnote omitted).
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advise the corporation during Michel's temporary ouster, even though
the board of directors had specifically sought the representation.122
The attorneys in Banks viewed themselves as representing the cor-
poration rather than Michel during the bulk of their engagement, a view
consistent with the entity theory of both the Model Code and the Model
Rules. Although they later were somewhat uncertain about the true cli-
ent in their more personal work for Michel - the will and employment
contract 123 - at the time they may well have seen those activities as
incidental to their representation of the corporation, small conveniences
that lawyers typically provide to the officers of organizational clients. 124
And when the highest authority of the corporation, the board of direc-
tors, requested the attorneys to continue serving the corporation, the at-
torneys complied.
In another disciplinary proceeding, In re Brownstein,125 the attorney
again was charged with a conflict of interest in a corporate representa-
tion. Brownstein had incorporated a drapery business founded by
Woods, who was a major shareholder along with his father and a friend.
Brownstein later served as corporate counsel. When the company faced
financial trouble, the attorney introduced Woods to Whitcomb, another
of Brownstein's clients who invested in small businesses. Whitcomb in-
vested in the drapery business, in exchange for a corporate note guaran-
teed by Woods.
Eventually the corporation defaulted on the note and fired Brown-
stein as corporate counsel. Whitcomb, represented by Brownstein,
pursued Woods on his personal guaranty. When the bar challenged
Brownstein for his conflict of interest, he contended that he had repre-
sented the corporation, not Woods, when Whitcomb was brought in to
the company as an investor. Because he had represented only the corpo-
122. The court also found that Thompson should not have represented the competitor while still
involved in some of UML's activities. But the court found the defendants innocent of the specific
disciplinary charge brought by the Oregon State Bar regarding the representation of the competitor.
123. When Thompson was deposed, he considered drafting the wills to be a personal activity for
the Michels. Regarding the employment contract, Thompson testified at various points, "'I guess I
was representing both sides, maybe. I don't know,'" and" '[t]he [employment contract was] drawn
when we were representing the company, and at that time I certainly felt that I was drawing it on
behalf of the company, and, oh, I suppose it's like a lot of employment contracts. You draw - you
know, when you've got a friendly client, he doesn't hire outside counsel. He knows how much
money he wants and that's it, you know.'" 584 P.2d at 291.
124. Based on the Author's own experience as an attorney, it is a rare attorney who has not
reviewed a lease, discussed a traffic violation, or done some other small favor for the officers or
employees of an organizational client. Those favors are typically done without considering the true
"client" in the representation.
125. 602 P.2d 655 (Or. 1979) (per curiam).
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ration, Brownstein contended that he had no conflict in representing
Whitcomb. The court disagreed. The rights of the controlling share-
holder in a closely-held corporation are "virtually identical and insepara-
ble" '126 with and from the corporation so that the attorney in fact had
represented Woods as well as the corporation. That prior representation
precluded Brownstein's later representation of Whitcomb in the collec-
tion action. In the court's words,
[w]here a small, closely held corporation is involved, and in the absence of a
clear understanding with the corporate movers that the attorney represents
solely the corporation and not their individual interests, it is improper for
the attorney thereafter to represent a third party whose interests are adverse
to those of the stockholders and which arise out of a transaction which the
attorney handled for the corporation. In actuality, the attorney in such a
situation represents the corporate owners in their individual capacities as
well as the corporation unless other arrangements are clearly made.
... [W]hen such a transaction is handled, it should be with extreme
caution and with a clear and explicit understanding concerning whom the
lawyer represents.1
27
126. 602 P.2d at 656.
127. 602 P.2d at 657 (citations omitted).
In a later disciplinary case, the Oregon Supreme Court returned to the subject of conflicts in close
corporations. In In re Kinsey, 660 P.2d 660 (Or. 1983), Kinsey was retained to organize a corpora-
tion, Berlinair, that would operate an air taxi service. After the three principal shareholders of the
corporation had a falling-out, the holders of two-thirds of the corporation's stock requested that
Kinsey organize a separate corporation without ownership participation by the minority share-
holder, and Kinsey did so. The new corporation would compete with Berlinair by taking advantage
of a corporate opportunity that otherwise could have been exploited by Berlinair.
In a subsequent disciplinary proceeding, Kinsey apparently argued, among other things, that his
true clients were the majority shareholders so there was no conflict in his continuing to represent
them in organizing the new corporation. The Oregon Supreme Court explained a portion of the
quoted section by saying:
The language in Brownstein [that the attorney for a close corporation in actuality repre-
sents the corporate owners] should not be misinterpreted. It refers to the special rela-
tionship in Banks where the controlling stockholder was the corporation. The
appropriate rule for a corporation with minority stockholders with substantial interests
such as [the 33 percent share at issue in Kinsey] is:
"As a corporation speaks and acts only through its officers and directors, its counsel
is their legal advisor in respect to its affairs, but in performing that duty he is acting as
the corporation's attorney only and not as the attorney of any of its stockholders,
directors, or officers as individuals, or any group or faction thereof." ABA Opinion
86 (1932). ...
660 P.2d at 670 n.10.
The court's attempt to limit Banks by defining duties based on the extent of stock ownership is
unconvincing. R. S. Michel, the principal of the close corporation involved in Banks, owned 29
percent of the stock, and his wife and daughters owned 29 percent, 21 percent, and 21 percent of the
stock, respectively. Under the holding in Kinsey, the holding in Banks would have been quite differ-
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The decisions in Banks and Brownstein are important on several
counts. They indicate that the attorney must consider the expectations
of the constituents within the organization when defining the "client."' 28
As the court said in Banks, there was no reason for Michel to differenti-
ate between his own and the corporation's interests. And, in the court's
view, he rightfully believed that the attorneys would pursue only his indi-
vidual interests. On that point, Banks and Brownstein are typical of a
trend of cases that trace the commencement of an attorney-client rela-
tionship to the mind of the putative client and his or her reasonable be-
liefs.129 The decisions are refreshingly realistic about the quotidian
operation of many corporate representations. Significantly, the court in
ent. Since the percentage of Michel's stock ownership could not have been the true rationale for the
decision, the decision in Banks must rest on different footing.
128. But cf. Felty v. Hartweg, 523 N.E.2d 555 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988), where the court stated in
dicta:
The allegation that [the lawyer for the closely held corporation] should have known he
was expected to protect the minority shareholders is an allegation which places upon
him a duty not imposed by law. Even if, as alleged, he knew of those expectations, that
- would not necessarily have imposed a duty which he would owe to a client. In any
event, as the charge is alleged in the disjunctive, it is an improper allegation, because the
duty cannot be imposed on a theory [the attorney] should have known of the
expectations.
129. In Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 955 (1978), Kirkland & Ellis represented an incorporated association, the American Petro-
leum Institute (API). On behalf of API, Kirkland solicited business information from API's mem-
bers, including Kerr-McGee, about their holdings in non-traditional fuels such as uranium. Later,
another office of Kirkland filed an antitrust suit on behalf of Westinghouse against Kerr-McGee and
others alleging a conspiracy in the uranium industry.
In response to a motion to disqualify in the antitrust action, Kirkland contended that it had no
attorney-client relationship with Kerr-McGee or the other API member responding to the question-
naire. The court held that a fiduciary or implied professional relationship existed between the firm
and the respondents because the latter reasonably believed the firm to be acting in their best inter-
ests. Further, the court held that the law firm had the duty to apprise the respondents of conflicts of
interest.
Accord Glueek v. Jonathan Logan, Inc., 512 F. Supp. 223 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 653 F.2d 746 (2d
Cir. 1981) (holding that attorneys had professional relationship with individual member of incorpo-
rated trade association).
In Rosman v. Shapiro, 653 F. Supp. 1441 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) one of two fifty-percent shareholders
in the corporation Filtomat, sued the corporation and the remaining shareholder, Shapiro, for an
accounting and damages. The corporation had been created to distribute water filtration products
from an Israeli manufacturer. At some point after the corporation had been created, Rosman and
Shapiro consulted with the law firm of Yisraeli and Yerushalmi concerning their distribution agree-
ment with the manufacturer. Rosman and Shapiro disagreed sharply over their rights under the
distribution agreement, and Rosman sued. Shapiro countersued. The law firm represented Shapiro
and Filtomat in both actions. Rosman moved to disqualify the firm in both actions.
Shapiro and the law firm contended that the firm had represented only the corporation, but the
court rejected that claim:
The Court may find that an attorney-client relationship existed between Rosman and
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Brownstein assigns the burden of identifying conflicts and clarifying the
scope of the representation to the lawyer. 3 ' The lawyer is in a unique
position to identify incipient conflicts of interest, and cannot deflect that
burden onto the entity or constituents who claim some protection.'
3'
These cases still view the corporation as at least a nominal client,
although it is difficult to conceive that the corporation as an entity has
any genuine interest of its own when the corporation's stock is owned by
one or a few persons. The courts promote the appearance of compliance
with the traditional entity notion, a concept so entrenched in the law that
the courts are not prepared to abandon it openly.
Paying homage to the entity theory while disregarding it is not unu-
sual. Some courts have acknowledged the traditional rule, but then con-
cluded that the rule does not apply absolutely to close corporations for
any number of pragmatic reasons. For example, in In re Nulle, 3 2 the
court said that following the rule that a corporation is an entity distinct
from its members or stockholders "would require blinding ourselves to
its realities."' 1 3 And again, in In re Roberts, 34 the court noted the harsh
[Yisraeli and Yerushalmi] if Rosman reasonably believed that [the corporation's lawyer]
was acting as his counsel.
... Although, in the ordinary corporate situation, corporate counsel does not neces-
sarily become counsel for the corporation's shareholders and directors,. . . where, as
here, the corporation is a close corporation consisting of only two shareholders with
equal interests in the corporation, it is indeed reasonable for each shareholder to believe
that the corporate counsel is in effect his own individual attorney.
This is especially true in this case because both Rosman and Shapiro treated Filtomat
as if it were a partnership rather than a corporation. In short, it would exalt form over
substance to conclude that [Yisraeli and Yerushalmi] only represented Filtomat, solely
because Rosman and Shapiro chose to deal with [the manufacturer] through a corporate
entity.
Id. at 1445 (footnotes omitted).
130. This view is consistent with the Model Rules, which permit dual representation of a corpo-
ration and its shareholders if the clients give informed consent. Rule 1.13(e) provides that "[a]
lawyer representing an organization may also represent any of its directors, officers, employees,
members, shareholders or other constituents, subject to the provisions of Rule 1.7." MODEL RULES,
supra note 7, Rule 1.13(e). Model Rule 1.7, the general conflict of interest rule, also provides,
"[w]hen representation of multiple clients in a single matter is undertaken, the consultation shall
include explanation of the implications of the common representation and the advantages and risks
involved." Id. Rule 1.7()(2). A lawyer acting as an intermediary between clients must make simi-
lar disclosures. Id. Rule 2.2(a). If conflicts of interest arise, the attorney must withdraw. Id. Rule
1.16(a)(1). Cf. In re Roberts, 75 B.R. 402 (D. Utah 1987) (attorney seeking employment in bank-
ruptcy proceeding has duty to inform court of any conflicts of interest).
131. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir.), cert denied,
439 U.S. 955 (1978).
132. 620 P.2d 214 (Ariz. 1980).
133. 620 P.2d at 217. In re Nulle was a disciplinary proceeding in which an attorney, Nulle,
was charged with unethical conduct arising from his representation of several corporations. For
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economic consequences to the individual clients if the court adhered
strictly to the entity rule and required them to retain separate counsel for
their bankrupt corporation.135 The court noted in Rosman v. Shapiro 
1 36
that following the entity rule "would exalt form over substance."
1 37
Labor union cases also raise interesting questions for other entity
representations. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Hoffa 1 38 was
a derivative action by a small group of dissident union members against
union officers for wrongful expenditure of union funds. The union, a
nominal plaintiff in the case, sought to be realigned as a defendant. The
union's attorney also represented one of the defendant officers, and the
plaintiffs moved to disqualify the attorney. The court prohibited the de-
fense lawyer from representing the union. Allowing the dual representa-
tion would permit union funds to be used to defend officers charged with
wrongdoing and might dictate the outcome of the charges against the
officers.
several years, Nulle had represented Rare Earth Development Company, whose principals were
Nocifera and Wirth, and later assisted them in the purchase of a new company, UID. Without the
knowledge of Rare Earth, Nocifera, or Wirth, Nulle later acquired and exercised an option to
purchase fifty percent of the stock of UID.
In defense of disciplinary charges arising from the incident, Nulle claimed that he represented
only UID, not the individual shareholders, and that his actions in obtaining and exercising the stock
option were in the best interest of his corporate client.
The court responded:
Respondent cites.., the proposition that a corporation is for most purposes an entity
distinct from its individual members or stockholders. While this may be generally true,
application of such a rule to the case at bar would require blinding ourselves to its reali-
ties.
The record before us discloses that for about four years before January of 1976 re-
spondent had represented various corporations and business enterprises of Wirth and
Nocifera and had represented each of those men in small personal matters .... "In
actuality, the attorney in such a situation represents the corporate owners in their indi-
vidual capacities as well as the corporation ...."
We find that under the circumstances of this case, respondent represented James
Wirth and Sam Nocifera as well as UID ....
620 P.2d at 217 (quoting In re Brownstein, 602 P.2d 655, 657 (Or. 1979); citations omitted).
134. 75 B.R. 402 (D. Utah 1987).
135. The attorneys in the case represented the debtor corporation, Roberts, Inc., as well as Mr.
and Mrs. Roberts individually. The Roberts were both debtors and creditors of the corporation.
The court noted that the simultaneous representation of both the debtor and creditor in an ordinary
bankruptcy proceeding would constitute a conflict of interest. But the court believed it necessary to
examine the possibility of conflict more closely where a small, closely-held entity was involved. The
court permitted the simultaneous representation because of the severe financial hardship of hiring
separate counsel and the importance of honoring a party's right to choose its own counsel.
136. 653 F. Supp. 1441 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
137. Id. at 1445.
138. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Hoffa, 242 F. Supp. 246 (D.D.C. 1965).
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[C]ounsel who are chosen by and represent officers charged with the mis-
conduct, and who also represent the union, are not able to guide the litiga-
tion in the best interest of the union because of the conflict in counsel's
loyalties. In such a situation it would be incumbent upon counsel not to
represent both the union and the officers.
Where, as here, union officials are charged with breach of fiduciary
duty, the organization is entitled to an evaluation and representation of its
institutional interests by independent counsel, unencumbered by potentially
conflicting obligations to any defendant officer.
139
In a later proceeding dealing with the selection of counsel, the court
acknowledged the possibility that it might have to select counsel, but
declined to do so."4
The same court voiced similar concerns a few years later in a series
of cases involving the fight by Joseph Yablonski and others for control of
the United Mine Workers union. 4 ' The court set out its standards in the
first case, Yablonski v. United Mine Workers. 42 The plaintiffs, individual
union members, charged defendant officers with misappropriation of
union funds, and challenged the dual representation by the union's re-
tained outside counsel of both the union and the defendant officers. At
the time, the union's attorneys were also representing the union and one
or more of its officers in a number of other suits pending between the
Yablonski faction and the entrenched union leadership.
The court concluded that union retained counsel should be disquali-
fied and should continue its representation of the officers alone. Follow-
ing the analysis of Hoffa, the court concluded that the union needed an
objective assessment of its institutional interests unhindered by allegiance
to individuals within the union, and that the continued dual representa-
tion might determine the outcome in the underlying suit. Even if the
conflict of interest was, as the defendants contended, still incipient, the
court thought it appropriate to act before the actual conflict arose and to
require separate counsel.
143
139. 242 F. Supp. at 255-56 (quoting Milone v. English, 306 F.2d 814, 817 (D.C. Cir. 1962)).
140. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Hoffa, 52 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 116,634 (D.D.C. 1965).
141. Yablonski v. UMW, 448 F.2d 1175 (D.C. Cir. 1971) [hereinafter cited as Yablonski 1],
petition for further relief granted, 454 F.2d 1036 (D.C. Cir.), and cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Yablonski I1]; Weaver v. UMW, 492 F.2d 580 (D.C. Cir. 1973) [hereinafter
cited as Yablonski 111].
142. Yablonski I, 448 F.2d 1175 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
143. See also Tucker v. Shaw, 378 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1967) (noting that in disqualifying
union's counsel, "it was clearly within the discretion of the district judge to nip any potential conflict
of interest in the bud").
In Yablonski II, the union's in-house counsel attempted to represent the officers following the
19921
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The Hoffa and Yablonski cases, while concerned with labor unions,
still raise interesting questions for all entity representations. The judges
in those cases recognized that organizational counsel had a conflict of
interest in litigation between the officers who chose her, the entity, and
ultimately, the union members themselves. If that is so, one may ask
why the courts implicitly assume these conflicts exist only during litiga-
tion. The courts may be assuming the conflict is never serious enough
outside litigation to require outside counsel for the entity and the in-
dependent "evaluation and representation of its institutional
interests." 144
One may also ask why courts like Hoffa find it so clearly "incum-
bent on the attorney" not to represent both the officers and the union in
litigation, when the ethical codes generally permit an attorney to do so
when the parties are not in court. Litigation gives dissidents - and they
must generally be sophisticated dissidents at that - a procedural vehicle
in which to raise the issue of counsel's loyalty, a vehicle denied them
outside litigation. Counsel for an entity, whether that entity is a labor
union or a thrift institution, must constantly watch for conflicts between
the interests of officers and the interests of other constituent groups.
The attorney's duty to identify conflicts and to require retention of
outside counsel for the independent evaluation of institutional interests is
greater when there is no other vehicle through which outsiders can raise
the issue. Cases and codes already require a lawyer to speak when the
circumstances indicate a misapprehension about the lawyer's true role
and loyalty. 145 That requirement is fairly levied because the lawyer is in
a unique position to realize and correct the conflict, and the putative
client has no other means by which to raise the issue. Further, given the
courts' reluctance, as demonstrated in Hoffa, to intervene in the selection
withdrawal of outside counsel. But the court found that arrangement subject to the same infirmities
identified in Yablonski I, and disqualified in-house counsel from representing the union. Yablonski
I1, 454 F.2d 1036 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972).
By the time of Yablonski III, the Yablonski faction had won control of the union and its general
counsel's office. Because the conflict between the union's and defendant officers' interests no longer
existed, the court declined to disqualify in-house counsel from representing the union and allowed
the union to realign as a party plaintiff. Yablonski 11I, 492 F.2d 580 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
144. Hoffa, 242 F. Supp. at 256.
145. See MODEL RULES, supra note 7, Rule 4.3, which imposes the duty on a lawyer dealing
with unrepresented persons to clarify any misapprehensions about whom the lawyer represents; and
Togstad v. Vesely, Otto, Miller & Keefe, 291 N.W.2d 686 (Minn. 1980) (lawyer who declined repre-
sentation nonetheless liable for negligently given advice since lawyer should have known prospective
client was relying on his opinion).
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of counsel by an organization, the lawyer's role in protecting the institu-
tion as a whole increases in importance.
The dissatisfaction with the entity rule is well-deserved. The rule
assumes that representation of all types of organizations is the same and
that the actors in all organizations follow the tidy behavioral model and
organizational chart that underlay the entity rule. That a number of
courts have diverged from the entity rule does not indicate that the
courts flout or ignore the ethical rules. Instead, the growing body of
contrary authority demonstrates that the ethical rules themselves do not
conform to the actual behavior and expectations of actors within organi-
zations and the lawyers who represent them. Under the Model Code and
Model Rules, the courts would be justified in relying upon the entity
theory's comfortable fiction. But when they have to justify the behavior
of attorneys whose actions, at least viscerally, seem inappropriate, they
frequently find that fiction deeply unsatisfying.
V. CASE TRENDS EXPANDING THE SCOPE OF
THE ATrORNEY's DUTIES
The recent cases dealing with entity representation increasingly have
abandoned the traditional conception of "the client." Not surprisingly,
cases dealing with other aspects of the attorney-client relationship reflect
a similar willingness to broaden an attorney's duties to parties other than
the traditional client. Although the courts are reluctant to designate
these third parties as "clients" in the complete, formal sense, the cases
reflect a piecemeal extension to noncients, thought to be deserving for
one reason or another, of certain duties historically reserved only for
clients.
A. The Duty of Care
The broadening of attorneys' duties began in a series of securities
cases more than twenty years ago. Before that time, securities lawyers
had been held liable for active participation in securities fraud.146 But
lawyers who acted solely as lawyers in transactions generally were not
held liable.147 The SEC began to advocate a higher duty for securities
146. See, eg., United States v. Crosby, 294 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 984
(1962) (affirming securities fraud conviction of attorney who had helped organize takeover scheme).
147. See, eg., Wonneman v. Stratford See. Co., [1957-1961 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep.
(CCH) 1 91,034 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (attorney who rendered legal services in connection with sale of
unregistered stock not liable under Securities Act of 1933 since attorney did not directly participate
in the sale or control of unregistered securities).
1992]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
lawyers in the early 1970s, and thereafter the Commission pursued attor-
neys for securities violations even when the attorneys had not been ac-
tively involved in the securities violations.
148
The defenders of the SEC's position believed that it was warranted
by the unique role of attorneys in the securities registration process:
[Tihe professional judgment of the attorney is often the 'passkey' to securi-
ties transactions.
... [T]he security [sic] bar's conception of its role too sharply contrasts with
the reality of its role in the securities process to escape notice and atten-
tion-and in such situations the reality eventually prevails. Lawyers are
not paid in the amounts they are to put the representations of their clients
in good English.149
The SEC further articulated this position in disciplinary proceedings
against members of the securities bar.150 For example, in defending its
right to disqualify an attorney from practicing before it, the Commissidn
said:
[The notion that state ethical standards are the exclusive control over secur-
ities lawyers] overlooks the peculiarly strategic and especially central place
of the private practicing lawyer in the investment process and in the en-
forcement of the body of federal law aimed at keeping that process fair....
[T]his Commission... is peculiarly dependent on the probity and the dili-
gence of the professionals who practice before it .... This is a field where
unscrupulous lawyers can inflict irreparable harm on those who rely on the
disclosure documents they produce. 
One of the better known decisions during this era was Escott v. Bar-
Chris Construction Corp. "2 BarChris prepared and filed a registration
148. For an early review of these actions, see Lewis D. Lowenfels, Expanding Public Responsi.
bilities of Securities Lawyers: An Analysis of the New Trend in Standard of Care and Priorities of
Duties, 74 COLuM. L. REv. 412 (1974).
149. A.A. Sommer, Jr., The Emerging Responsibilities of the Securities Lawyer, (Address by
SEC Commissioner, Jan. 1974), in [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,631,
at 83,689 (Jan. 1974).
150. Under Rule 2(e) of the SEC's Rules of Practice, the Commission can discipline or suspend
attorneys from practice before the Commission. 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1990). Persons may be sus.
pended for lack of qualifications, commission of unethical conduct, or aiding and abetting a securi-
ties violation by another person.
151. In re Emanuel Fields, Securities Act Release No. 5404, [1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 79,407, at 83,175 n.20 (June 18, 1973).
See also In re Keating, Muething & Klekamp, Exchange Act Release No. 15,982, [1979 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. % 82,124 (July 2, 1979) (Commission ordered law firm to adopt internal
supervisory procedures to ensure full disclosure of information in registration statement. Firm had
represented company controlled by Charles H. Keating, Jr.).
152. 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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statement before attempting to sell corporate debentures.153 Purchasers
of debentures sued the signers of the registration statement, the under-
writers, and the company's auditors, alleging that the defendants had in-
cluded false statements in the registration statement and omitted
material information.154 Grant, the corporation's attorney and one of its
directors, was among the defendants. He had prepared and signed the
registration statement. The court found that the registration statement
contained a number of falsities and omissions relating to the financial
condition of the company.
Grant claimed that he was not liable under the securities laws be-
cause he had investigated the statements in the registration statement
and had reasonably believed them to be true. 55 In evaluating his claim,
the court considered "the unique position which he occupied"' 56 as an
outside director and attorney for the corporation. The court concluded
that "[Im]ore was required of him in the way of reasonable investigation
than could fairly be expected of a director who had no connection with
this work."' 57 Grant had the duty to investigate further those portions
of the registration statement not prepared by experts by verifying state-
153. A debenture is a form of long-term debt instrument. A company issuing a debenture obli-
gates itself to repay the principal amount of the debenture to the purchaser at a specific time, and
generally to pay interest at set intervals before the maturity date of the debenture. Debentures are
unsecured obligations. ROBERT W. HAMILTON, FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN BusINESS § 15.9
(1989). Debentures are a form of "security" under the securities laws. 15 U.S.C. § 77(b) (1988). An
issuer of securities must file a registration statement with the Securities and Exchange Commission
before offering the securities for sale in interstate commerce. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1988).
154. Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 imposes civil liability for material misstatements
and omissions contained in registration statements. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1988).
155. Grant's claim is known as a "due diligence" defense. Under § 11(b) of the 1933 Act, a
party other than the issuer of securities may avoid liability for parts of the registration statement not
prepared by experts (the "non-expertised" portions of the registration statement). To benefit from
the due diligence defense the party must establish that he or she (1) conducted a reasonable investi-
gation, and (2) after reasonable investigation, had reasonable ground to believe and did believe that
the statements in the registration statement were true and that no material facts had been omitted.
15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3)(A) (1988). Reasonableness is assessed according to the conduct of a prudent
person in the management of his or her own property. Id. § 77(c).
156. 283 F. Supp. at 690.
157. Id. Generally, outside directors are held to a lesser standard of diligence than inside direc-
tors. Goldstein v. Alodex Corp., 409 F. Supp. 1201, 1203 n.1 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
In Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), the court
went even further and held a lawyer-director to the standard of an inside director. The case was a
class action for misrepresentations contained in a registration statement issued in an exchange offer
transaction. Leasco offered to exchange preferred shares and stock warrants for the common stock
of Reliance Insurance Co. The registration statement did not mention that Reliance had a large cash
surplus (that is, cash reserves exceeding the amount necessary for insurance operations). The sur-
plus could be diverted to non-insurance businesses, and Leasco planned to use the fund for acquisi-
tions and other operations. Reliance's attorney, Hodes, had served on the board of directors for
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ments against source documents, reading corporate contracts and corpo-
rate minutes, and perhaps investigating certain matters with the
company's outside auditors. By holding Grant to a different duty of in-
vestigation from other outside directors solely because he was also the
corporation's attorney, the court essentially held that a corporate attor-
ney has a duty to the investing public who purchases in reliance on the
registration statement.
The securities case from this era most analogous to the thrift cases is
Securities and Exchange Commission v. National Student Marketing
Corp.15 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) engendered
tremendous debate in the bar and the academy when it filed a complaint
against two prominent law firms and several individual lawyers within
those firms.159 White & Case had represented National Student Market-
ing Corp. (NSMC), whom the SEC charged with securities law violations
arising from a merger, among other transactions. Lord, Bissell & Brook
had represented Interstate National Corporation (Interstate), the merger
target.
The parties signed the merger agreement in August 1969, just before
the end of NSMC's fiscal year, so NSMC provided financial information
to Interstate from the 1967-1968 fiscal year and with interim information
for the 1968-1969 fiscal year, in the form of unaudited financial state-
ments for the first nine months of the year. Both companies solicited and
received shareholder approval of the merger based upon those interim
financial statements, which showed that NSMC had produced a $700,000
profit for the interim period. The merger agreement required each com-
pany's accountants to provide a "comfort letter" at closing stating that
the interim financial statements were accurate.
On the day of the closing, the accounting firm preparing the comfort
letter for NSMC told the attorneys for NSMC that the interim state-
ments should be adjusted to reflect certain deferred costs, uncollectible
receivables, and other charges against income. Interstate and its attor-
neys were made aware of these suggested adjustments before the closing,
but were not apprised of the effect the adjustments ultimately had upon
the profitability of NSMC. In fact, NSMC assured Interstate that the
more than three years at the time of the exchange offer and was actively involved in the negotiations
between Leasco and Reliance.
158. 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978).
159. The SEC sought injunctive relief against the law firms and a number of other parties for




adjustments would not affect the company's earnings significantly. Inter-
state considered postponing the closing, but elected to complete the
merger as scheduled.
Neither law firm disclosed the accountants' suggested adjustments
to shareholders or public investors. Both law firms issued opinion letters
to consummate the merger. Neither opinion letter mentioned the dis-
crepancies in the financial information.
NSMC's attorney also learned before closing that, if the company
adjusted the financial statements as suggested, it would show a net loss
for the interim period, rather than a $700,000 profit, and that the com-
pany would only break even for the fiscal year. Just after the closing, the
accountants also recommended to NSMC's attorney that the company
resolicit the approval of its shareholders with the correct information.
NSMC's attorney did not disclose the consequences of the financial ad-
justments or the recommendation of the resolicitation to Interstate or its
attorneys. Interstate did not learn of these matters until a few days after
closing, when the accountants provided the final version of their comfort
letter to directors for both companies.
The SEC contended that the attorneys should have refused to issue
the opinion letters and should have demanded that shareholders be re-
solicited with the new financial information. If their respective clients
refused to comply with this advice, the SEC contended that the attorneys
should have withdrawn from the representation and informed the SEC of
the misleading financial information." °
Ultimately, White & Case settled with the SEC,16 but Lord, Bissell
& Brook proceeded to bench trial. The court concluded that the firm
had aided and abetted a violation of the securities laws because of its
160. SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep.
(CCH) 93,360 at 91,913-17 (D.D.C 1972). See also Summary of Pretrial Brief of SEC, SEC v.
National Student Mktg. Corp., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) % 95,784, at
90,837 (D.D.C. 1976).
Several years later, the SEC also suggested ways securities lawyers could respond to client viola-
tions of securities laws, such as resignation or resort to the board of directors. In re Carter and
Johnson, Release No. 34-17597, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) % 82,847 (Feb. 28,
1981).
161. SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) % 96,027 (D.D.C. 1977). White & Case agreed principally to adopt internal review proce-
dures for securities transactions. The firm also agreed not to issue opinion letters in connection with
securities if the firm knew of material misrepresentations or adverse changes, and agreed to consider
withdrawal from the representation if the client did not disclose the information.
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failure to interfere with the merger.162 Upon learning of the misleading
financial information, "the attorneys' responsibilities to their corporate
client required them to take steps to ensure that the information would
be disclosed to the shareholders." 163 The attorneys could not "rest on
asserted 'business judgments' as justification for their failure to make a
legal decision pursuant to their fiduciary responsibilities to client
shareholders." 16
National Student Marketing states that attorneys who represent a
corporation have a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of the corporation,
not simply to the corporation itself. Other securities decisions have re-
flected a similar willingness to broaden the scope of the attorney's duties
to noncients by liberalizing the standing requirements for securities
suits. A common theme in these cases is some foreseeable reliance on the
misleading information by the injured party.1
65
In addition to the securities cases, malpractice cases gradually have
broadened the scope of an attorney's duty of care. One notable example
is Fickett v. Superior Court.'66 Attorney Fickett had represented Schwa-
ger, the guardian for Styer. During the representation, Schwager used
assets of the guardianship estate for his own benefit.' 67 He loaned money
to a business that his wife partly owned, paid himself and his family large
management fees from a building he purchased for the estate, and com-
mingled estate funds in his own account. Before a court finally removed
Schwager as guardian, he had severely depleted the estate, leaving his
previously wealthy ward in serious financial condition.
162. The SEC, however, did not establish the likelihood of a further violation, so the court
denied the injunction.
163. SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682, 713 (D.D.C. 1978).
164. Id. at 713-14. Similarly, in SEC v. Electronics Warehouse, Inc., 689 F. Supp. 53 (D. Conn.
1988), aff'd sub nom. SEC v. Calvo, 891 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1989), and cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3228
(1990), the attorney for the underwriter in a public offering was held liable as an aider and abettor
for writing a letter that "substantially facilitated" the securities law violations. 689 F. Supp. at 65.
165. See, eg., Commins v. Johnson & H-iggins, Inc., [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 94,092 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (attorney may be liable to a "nonclient" if the attorney
renders an opinion for his client and the attorney could have foreseen that the nonclient would see
and rely on the opinion in its transaction with the client); Andreo v. Friedlander, Gaines, Cohen,
Rosenthal & Rosenberg, 660 F. Supp. 1362, 1367 (D. Conn. 1987) ("[A]ttorneys can be held liable as
alders and abettors where it is reasonably foreseeable that potential investors will rely on documents
they draft, if they omit material information from those documents or include erroneous information
in reckless disregard for the truth."); and Haberman v. Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys., 744
P.2d 1032 (Wash. 1987) (en banc), appeal dismissed, 488 U.S. 805 (1988) (imposing liability on
attorney for negligent misrepresentation resulting from bond issue).
166. 558 P.2d 988 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976).
167. The facts of the guardianship are taken from a related proceeding, In re Guardianship of
Styer, 536 P.2d 717 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975).
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The new guardian sued Fickett for negligence in failing to discover
Schwager's defalcations. The guardian admitted that Fickett had not be-
haved collusively or fraudulently. Fickett contended, therefore, that he
was not liable to Styer because she was not his client. 6 ' The court con-
cluded that privity of contract was not essential: an attorney may be held
liable to a third person without privity of contract as a matter of public
policy. In reaching this decision, the court considered factors, such as
the foreseeability of harm, the blameworthiness of the attorney's con-
duct, and the policy of deterrence. 69 The court concluded that public
policy supported the conclusion that Fickett owed a duty to Styer:
We are of the opinion that when an attorney undertakes to represent the
guardian of an incompetent, he assumes a relationship not only with the
guardian but also with the ward. If, as is contended here, [Fickett] knew or
should have known that the guardian was acting adversely to his ward's
interest, the possibility of frustrating the whole purpose of the guardianship
became foreseeable as did the possibility of injury to the ward. In fact, we
conceive that the ward's interests overshadow those of the guardian.
170
Fickett suggests that if an attorney represents a party who has fidu-
ciary duties to a third party, the attorney has a duty of care to that third
party also.' 7' The attorney should consider the possible harm to the
third party, as well as the possible harm to the "whole purpose" of the
relationship between the fiduciary and the third party.
172
168. The common law supported Fickett's view. See Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195
(1879) (attorney not liable to non-client relying on title opinion absent fraud or collusion).
169. 558 P.2d at 990. Other factors include: 1) the actor's intent that the transaction affect the
plaintiff, 2) the certainty of the plaintiff's injury, and 3) the causal connection between the actor's
conduct and the injury. This so-called "balancing test" originated in a California case, Biakanja v.
Irving, 320 P.2d 16 (Cal. 1958). Several other courts, in addition to the Fickett court, have adopted
it, including: Licata v. Spector, 225 A.2d 28 (Conn. C.P. 1966); McAbee v. Edwards, 340 So.2d
1167 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); United Leasing Corp. v. Miller, 263 S.E.2d 313 (N.C. Ct. App.),
appeal denied, 267 S.E.2d 685 (N.C. 1980), subsequent appeal, 298 S.E.2d 409 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982);
Auric v. Continental Casualty Co., 331 N.W.2d 325 (Wis. 1983).
170. 558 P.2d at 990.
171. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Triangular Lawyer Relationships, 1 GEO. J. L. ETHICS 15, 17-
18 (1987).
172. As an alternative to the balancing approach followed in Fickett, other courts have held
attorneys liable to nonclients under third-party beneficiary principles. Disappointed beneficiaries
under negligently-prepared wills are frequent plaintiffs in these actions. See, eg., Guy v. Liederbach,
459 A.2d 744 (Pa. 1983) (attorney requested devisee to attest the will; devisee later barred from
taking devise because of her attestation). The nonclient can recover from the attorney for negligence
when certain conditions are met: 1) the court must recognize a duty of care in the attorney's per-
formance to effectuate the client's intentions, and 2) the client intended that the nondlient benefit
from the promised performance. 459 A.2d at 751. Some courts have preferred the third-party benefi-
ciary theory to the balancing test because of the specter of attorney liability to an ever-increasing
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B. Right to Disclosure
In a parallel development to the extension of attorneys' duties of
care, courts have imposed limited duties to disclose information to other
classes of persons. An early example is Garner v. Wolfinbarger,7 3 in
which shareholders brought securities claims and a derivative action re-
lating to a stock issue. During discovery, the shareholders inquired
about communications between the corporation's attorney and the cor-
poration that occurred during the challenged stock offering. The corpo-
ration and its attorney asserted that the attorney-client privilege
precluded disclosure to the shareholders. The court created an exception
to the privilege:
[W]here the corporation is in suit against its stockholders on charges of
acting inimically to stockholder interests, protection of those interests as
well as those of the corporation and of the public require that the availabil-
ity of the privilege be subject to the right of the stockholders to show cause
why it should not be invoked in the particular instance. 174
The Fifth Circuit justified the result on several grounds, two of
which are relevant here. First, the court recognized that corporate man-
agement acts on behalf of the stockholders. "Conceptualistic phrases
describing the corporation as an entity separate from its stockholders are
not useful tools of analysis. They serve only to obscure the fact that
management has duties which run to the benefit ultimately of the
stockholders."
' 171
Second, the court believed that the joint client exception to the privi-
lege militated toward disclosure. Under the exception, when an attorney
acts for two or more parties, neither client can assert the privilege against
the other in a later dispute between the two clients.' 76 By invoking the
joint client exception, the court indicated it viewed shareholders as cli-
ents of the corporate attorney, at least for the limited purpose of
disclosure.
17 7
number of persons. See, eg., Pelham v. Griesheimer, 440 N.E.2d 96 (Ill. 1982) (expressing concern
about large number of unknown potential plaintiffs).
173. 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970), cerL denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971).
174. 430 F.2d at 1103-04. The factors that may be considered in determining good cause in-
clude: the number of shareholders seeking disclosure and the number of shares they hold; the good
faith of the claim; the necessity of having the information and its availability from other sources; the
nature of the charges against the corporation; and the specificity of the request for information. In
camera inspection and protective orders are appropriate to protect against wider disclosure of sensi-
tive information. Id. at 1104.
175. Id. at 1101.
176. JOHN H. WIGMORE, 8 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2312 (1961).
177. A few courts have limited the Garner exception or rejected it as unsound. See, e.g., Weil v.
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Other courts have applied the Garner rationale in different contexts,
such as disputes between labor unions and their members, 178 bankruptcy
creditors and the creditors' committee,17 9 and other controversies be-
tween parties standing in some fiduciary relationship. 8 0 Indeed, some
later courts have viewed the existence of a fiduciary relationship between
the party who consulted with the attorney and the party seeking discio-
sure as the true basis for the disclosure exception. 181 These cases suggest
very strongly that an attorney who represents a fiduciary owes disclosure
to the beneficiary of the fiduciary's actions.
18 2
Allowing disclosure of otherwise-privileged information to share-
holders or other persons in fiduciary relationships does not automatically
transform those persons into clients to whom the full range of duties are
owed. But one of the hallmarks of being a nonclient is that the attorney
and the true client can withhold certain types of information from the
Investment/Indicators, Research & Mgmt., Inc., 647 F.2d 18 (9th Cir. 1981) (declining to apply
exception in non-derivative suit); In re Atlantic Fin. Mgmt. Sec. Litig., 121 F.RD. 141 (D. Mass.
1988) (same); and Shirvani v. Capital Investing Corp., 112 F.RID. 389 (D. Conn. 1986) (criticizing
the exception as vague and unnecessary bemause shareholders are adequately protected by the crime-
fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege). Some commentators have criticized the exception
because of its potential chilling effect upon communications between corporate actors and corporate
counsel. See, ag., Developments in the Law - Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1451,
1524-30 (1985); and H. Richard Dallas, The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Corporation in Share-
holder Litigation, 50 S. CAL L. REv. 303 (1977). Nonetheless the exception is well-entrenched as
precedent.
178. Aguinaga v. John Morrell & Co., 112 F.R.D. 671 (D. Kan. 1986); Boswell v. IBEW 164,
106 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2713 (D.NJ. 1981).
179. In re Baldwin-United Corp., 38 B.R. 802 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1984).
180. See, ag., Quintel Corp. v. Citibank, 567 F. Supp. 1357 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (refusing privilege
claim by bank that had acted as fiduciary for purchaser in land acquisition); Washington-Baltimore
Newspaper Guild, Local 35 v. Washington Star Co., 543 F. Supp. 906 (D.D.C. 1982) (permitting
disclosure of communications between attorney and pension plan managers to private pension plan
beneficiaries without showing good cause); Donovan v. Fitzsimmons, 90 F.R.D. 583 (N.D. Ill. 1981)
(allowing Secretary of Labor to assert the rights of pension plan beneficiaries to disclosure from
trustees of union pension plan on showing of good cause); Valente v. Pepsico Inc., 68 F.R.D. 361 (D.
Del. 1975) (permitting disclosure to minority shareholder of communications between attorney and,
majority shareholder); Estate of Torian v. Smith, 564 S.W.2d 521 (Ark.), cert. denied sub nor. First
National Bank v. Smith, 439 U.S. 883, reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 973 (1978) (allowing residuary legatees
to inquire into communications between executor and attorney for estate).
181. See, eg., Washington-Baltimore Newspaper Guild, Local 35 v. Washington Star Co., 543
F. Supp. 906 (D.D.C. 1982) (refusing to require a showing of good cause for disclosure because that
showing is not required under the common law of trust relationships); Donovan v. Fitzsimmons, 90
F.R.D. 583, 586 (N.D. li. 1981) ("[The Garner approach is not premised on concepts peculiar to
corporate law, but rather has its underpinnings in the common law of trust relationships.").
182. See, eg., Helt v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n, 113 F.R.D. 7, 9 (D. Conn. 1986) ("When a
fiduciary communicates with its attorneys about a fund it administers for the benefit of others, courts
have held that the attorney-client privilege does not operate to conceal from the beneficiaries infor-
mation about the fund.").
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noncient. By allowing persons in fiduciary relationships - be they
shareholders, union members, or pension plan beneficiaries - access to
privileged information, Garner and its progeny have recognized an inter-
mediate class of persons, located somewhere on the continuum between
nonclients and clients. Persons in this intermediate group have been pul-
led from the multitudes of nonclients and vested with limited rights to
information.
VI. ANALYSIS OF THE THRIFr REPRESENTATION EXAMPLE
Increasingly, critics have decried the role that thrift lawyers played
in contributing to the crisis of the 1980s.183 Thrift lawyers have been
charged with participating in improper transactions (sometimes rising to
the level of aiding and abetting breaches of duty by others), disregarding
conflicts of interest, failing to monitor attorneys, and failing to protect
depositors and disclose wrongdoing."' 4 Former thrift counsel defend
their conduct as fully consistent with their duties to their clients."8 '
Clearly both critics and defenders cannot be correct. Analysis of the eth-
ical codes and cases reveals significant exposure for thrift attorneys on
several points.
A. Conflicts of Interest
In response to charges of conflict of interest, some attorneys might
believe that no conflict could exist because they represented the thrift
alone, not depositors or regulators. But conflicts of interest originated
among constituents within the thrift, more often than outside it. Even
without considering possible duties flowing to outsiders such as deposi-
tors, the purported actions of many thrift attorneys were improper under
current conflict of interest rules. The entity representation cases 86 show
an increased willingness to abandon the traditional formulation of the
attorney-client relationship, in favor of one based on expectations and the
183. For example, the former general counsel of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board of San
Francisco, after excoriating accountants and appraisers, said of attorneys: "[t]he final group of pro-
fessionals to prostitute themselves for these thrifts were the attorneys who structured the sham deals
and provided the legal opinions that regulations really were no barrier to whatever the fraudulent
insiders needed done." Investigation of Lincoln Savings, supra note 29, at 299.
184. See supra text accompanying notes 45-49.
185. In responding to questions about the propriety of a thrift attorney's actions on behalf of
Lincoln Savings Association, a defense attorney said that his client had done "exactly what a lawyer
is supposed to do." Rita H. Jensen, Reverberations From a Failure, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 13, 1989, at 1,
29.
186. See supra text accompanying notes 114-44.
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actual behavior of the parties. Under the analysis of these cases, many
thrift counsel were representing both the entity - so long as the law
wishes to sustain that fiction - and the controlling persons in the thrift,
who considered the thrift's interests to be identical with their own.
Many of the thrifts had precisely the kind of ownership structure that
makes the entity rule so farcical: a dominant person held all or virtually
all of the stock of the thrift and its holding company."8 7 When one or a
few persons owned a thrift, they did not differentiate between the entity's
interests and their own. They were clients on equal footing with the en-
tity itself. An entity lawyer may represent both the entity and one or
more of its constituents, but the attorney in doing so must comply with
the conflict of interest rules.' If the attorney's responsibilities to the
constituent conflict with his or her responsibilities to the entity, however,
the attorney must withdraw from his representation of the entity. 8 9
Thrift attorneys should have withdrawn when the controlling per-
sons were pursuing their own interests above those of the organization.
This conclusion raises some of the same questions that plague the entity
rule itself: What were the organization's best interests? Who was the
arbiter of those interests? In the end, the attorney must determine the
institution's interests as they relate to the attorney's compliance with eth-
ical rules.
This discussion does not suggest that attorneys for business entities
should supplant duly authorized management of the entities and decide
questions of business policy and daily operation. But attorneys are obli-
gated, with whatever partial lights they possess, to assess continually the
propriety of their own professional conduct. An attorney should not, for
example, decide whether a particular loan should be made. But the at-
torney must decide whether his or her own participation in the transac-
tion would violate the attorney's professional duties. The attorney must
be a limited arbiter of institutional interests because those interests are
the touchstone for his or her own decisions of professional duty.
The allegations in the thrift cases, if true, offer numerous examples
of misguided or unexercised professional judgment, as well as some
187. As one example, Jarrett E. Woods, Jr., purchased all the outstanding stock of Western
Savings Association, the subject of one suit against former thrift counsel. He then transferred all the
stock to a wholly-owned holding company. Complaint at 6-7, FDIC v. Vaughn, No. CA3-90-1282-
D (N.D.'Tex. filed June 4, 1990).
188. MODEL RULES, supra note 7, Rule 1.13(e).
189. Id Rule 1.16(a), which provides in part, "[A] lawyer shall not represent a client or, where
representation has commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of a client if... the represen-
tation will result in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law."
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guidelines for attorneys evaluating institutional interests. Those guide-
lines can be formulated as a series of questions.
1. Does the transaction violate internal rules?
Example: The attorneys for Silverado Savings and Loan Association alleg-
edly ignored internal lending limits that its board of directors established
after federal regulators criticized the institution's lending practices.
190
Those lending limits included restrictions on the aggregate of loans to a
single borrower, the size of loans on a single real estate project, and the
number of major real estate loans. 191 Federal regulators further allege that
the attorneys reviewed the internal documentation for the questionable
loans (such as the loan officers' files), discussed the transactions with man-
agement, documented the transactions, and supplied legal opinions.
192
Depository institutions, like other businesses, set internal policies
for the operation of the business. 19 One of the functions of the manage-
ment of depository institutions is to set internal lending criteria to govern
the extension of credit to borrowers. These policies are generally written,
and therefore are easily verifiable by attorneys. 194 Internal lending crite-
ria are an expression of institutional interests made independently of the
personal and political factors that might exist in a particular transaction.
Thrift attorneys should evaluate their own activities in light of lending
policies and other internal standards. If the allegations in the example
are true, the attorneys had ample opportunity to evaluate independently
whether their instructions to close the transactions comported with insti-
tutional interests, as expressed by internal lending criteria.
2. Does the transaction violate external rules?
Example: Thrifts are highly regulated. An oft-violated regulatory restric-
tion is the loans-to-one-borrower (LTOB) rule.195 The LTOB rule is
designed to force a thrift to spread its lending risk over a broad number of
borrowers. If an institution makes a significant percentage of its loans to a
single borrower or related entities, the institution increases the possibility
190. Complaint at 52, FDIC v. Wise, No. 90-F-1688 (D. Colo. filed Sept. 21, 1990).
191. Id. at 10.
192. Id at 54.
193. MORTEN BODFISH & ADRIAN D. THEOBALD, SAVINGS AND LOAN PRINCIPLES 193
(1938).
194. In some cases, attorneys might have to rely on thrift employees to provide necessary infor-
mation. For example, if an internal lending policy restricts loan amounts to a certain percentage of
the institution's net worth, the attorney probably will have to obtain net worth information from a
thrift employee to ensure compliance with the policy. However, attorneys should not be permitted
to assume compliance without the exercise of due diligence.
195. 12 C.F.R. § 563.93 (1991).
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that the financial difficulties of that one borrower will be ruinous to the
thrift.
The complaints against counsel are replete with claims that attor-
neys ignored the LTOB rule.'96 One means by which counsel allegedly
flouted the LTOB rule was structuring transactions to avoid its limits.
Faced with a lending limit that would prohibit a desired loan, counsel in
one case purportedly designed and documented the transaction as three
separate loans to related or interposed entities, without disclosing the
connected nature of the transactions. 97 Documented in this way, the
transaction appeared to comply with federal regulations.
An attorney can define an organization's interests by looking to the
legal environment in which the organization operates. With highly-regu-
lated businesses like depository institutions, each entity has an interest in
being operated in compliance with applicable regulations. Federal au-
thorities promulgate regulations to protect the safety and soundness of
each institution as a whole. 9 ' Regulators designing rules are presuma-
bly free from the self-interest that may infect actors within the thrift.
Thrift regulators have assessed independently which practices are benefi-
cial for the thrift in the long term and which are not. Knowledge of
regulations is the province of thrift attorneys, and those attorneys should
consider a transaction that violates regulations to be an action contrary
to the institution's best interests. Attorneys should also consider a re-
quest to structure a transaction to avoid regulatory prohibitions contrary
to the institution's best interests.
Attorneys are capable of understanding the policies underlying reg-
ulations like the LTOB rule. While the historical mission of attorneys
may have been to find "loopholes," an attorney for an entity such as a
thrift should not accept such a mission from a client unquestioningly. To
comply with the attorney's professional duties, the attorney must con-
stantly assess the entity's interests. An attorney can fairly assess those
interests only by considering the applicable regulations and their under-
lying policies.
3. Is there a plausible business explanation for the transaction?
Example: Vernon Savings Association (Vernon) owned a subsidiary, Dondi
196. Of the complaints reviewed, violation of the loans-to-one-borrower rule was the most fre-
quently cited regulatory violation involving lawyers.
197. Complaint at 16, FSLIC v. Lensing, Gravel, Rosenzweig, Christen & LeBeau, P.C., No.
89-329 (M.D. La. filed Apr. 28, 1989).
198. WHrrE, supra note 40, at 32.
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Residential Properties, Inc., which owned a great deal of real estate. Fed-
eral regulators allege that the subsidiary's properties were seriously over-
valued on Vernon's books, and that Vernon knew it would have to
recognize a loss on the properties at its fiscal year-end in 1985.199 Recog-
nizing that a loss would reduce Vernon's net worth and income, Vernon
purportedly began a campaign to sell its subsidiary's properties to existing
thrift borrowers or friends of thrift insiders.2°° The thrift financed the en-
tire purchase price of each property, allegedly with the association's assur-
ances that it would not require the borrower to make any principal or
interest payments and that Vernon would find another borrower to assume
the position of the first one.20 1 Federal regulators claim that Vernon's law-
yers knew about these side agreements with the borrowers.
20 2
During a brief period, the law firm allegedly documented and closed
some forty-seven loans in this series, totalling $98 million, many of them
occurring during the month before the thrift's fiscal year-end. Regulators
also claim that the lawyers realized the improper nature of the transactions,
but did little to discourage them.20 3
Assessing the plausibility of a transaction is more problematic for
the attorney because it risks that the attorney will usurp the legitimate
decisionmaking function of management. Yet competent and ethical
representation of any client, regardless of the context of the work or type
of client, requires an attorney to understand and question the client's
business motives and goals. If the client wishes to sue another person,
for example, the attorney should not bring suit if the action is frivo-
lous. 2' If the client wishes to consummate a business transaction, the
attorney must understand the nature of the client's business and the cli-
ent's objectives in the transaction, both to represent the client compe-
tently and to fulfill the attorney's own ethical obligations. The Model
Rules prohibit attorneys from participating in activity that is criminal or
fraudulent20 5 or that will conflict with the attorney's extant duties to
others.20 6 Questioning the client about its objectives is competent and
ethical lawyering, not unreasonable intermeddling. If the attorney is un-
satisfied with the answers to his or her questions, the attorney may rea-
sonably conclude that the transaction does not serve the best interests of
199. Complaint at 24-25, FDIC v. Bauman, No. CA3-90-614-H (N.D. Tex. filed March 19,
1990).
200. Id. at 26.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 28."
203. Id. at 26-28.
204. MODEL RULES, supra note 7, Rule 3.1.
205. Id. Rule 1.2(c), provides, "[a] lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client,
in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent ......
206. Id. Rule 1.7.
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the entity and that the attorney cannot ethically participate in the
venture.
A related question for the attorney is whether a single transaction,
although facially proper, is part of a larger series of improper transac-
tions. Just as an attorney should understand the business purpose of an
individual transaction, he or she should understand the purpose of a se-
ries of interrelated transactions. An attorney cannot be confident of the
ethical propriety of his or her work unless the attorney takes this broader
view. In a series of transactions, as chronicled above, an attorney might
view each transaction, standing alone, as the routine extension of a loan
by the thrift to a purchaser of an asset from the thrift's subsidiary. But
as it becomes clear that a series of transactions are related, the attorney
should question the ultimate purpose of the transactions as a group.
4. Who are the apparent beneficiaries of the transaction?
Example: A group of four men owned two different thrifts, Franklin Sav-
ings Association (Franklin) and Northwest Savings Association (North-
west). The group also owned a holding company, that, in turn, owned both
Franklin Savings and Northwest Savings. Mann, who was one of the four
owners, and a partner also jointly owned a third thrift, Equitable Savings
Association. Northwest Savings was nearing insolvency, and its four own-
ers wished to sell it. Mann proposed to the other owners that he purchase
Northwest Savings individually and merge it with Equitable Savings. To do
so, Mann would have to purchase his partner's interest in Equitable Savings
as well. The other owners agreed, and Franklin Savings extended three
loans to Mann of $10 million, $5.8 million, and $3.5 million, allowing him
to purchase his partner's interest and Northwest Savings. Federal regula-
tors claim that: 1) the terms of the $10 million note did not require Mann to
pay anything on the debt, 2) the thrift and the lawyers improperly docu-
mented the $5.8 million loan, and 3) only the stock of the holding company
that owned the already ailing Northwest Savings secured the $3.5 million
loan. They also allege that Franklin Savings did not underwrite the loans
to Mann, or review his financial position.2 7 They conclude that the four
owners of the holding company "used the assets of Franklin, not for the
benefit of Franklin, but for the benefit of [the four owners], who then
divested themselves of the troubled Northwest.,
208
The presence of large sums of money, the relative ease of appropriat-
ing funds, and the uncertainty of regulatory oversight combine to render
thrifts and similar institutions tempting prey for self-interested insiders.
By their nature, these institutions offer insiders "unparalleled opportuni-
207. Complaint at 18, FDIC v. Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, No. A-90-CA-925 (W.D. Tex. filed
Oct. 30, 1990).
208. Id. at 19.
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ties to abuse their positions and to use insured deposits and other bank
funds for their personal gain .... One way to do it is by making loans
that will directly or indirectly benefit the dominant individual."20 9 Fed-
eral regulations attempt to address this problem, in part, through limits
on loans to insiders and their related businesses.210 But insiders possibly
used more sophisticated means than direct loans to achieve similar ends,
as the above example shows.
So long as an attorney represents an entity, the attorney must evalu-
ate constantly the entity's interests and possible conflicts with the wishes
of entity insiders. In the same way that an attorney should evaluate the
business reasons for a transaction, an attorney also should assess the
transaction objectively to determine whether the transaction plausibly
benefits the entity. If the allegations in the example are true, for instance,
the attorney could have evaluated whether a promissory note that did
not require the borrower-insider to make payments principally benefitted
the thrift or the insider. If the attorney can find no rational explanation
for the transaction, from the entity's standpoint, the attorney may con-
clude that the attorney cannot participate in it.
B. Duties to Third Parties
Under the traditional entity fiction, an entity lawyer is entitled to
pursue the entity's interests as articulated by senior management regard-
less of the interests of other constituent groups.2 1 In the thrift context,
depositors of the thrifts are among those constituents. Traditional doc-
trine has also considered depositors mere creditors of the institution, un-
less the thrift is a mutual association.2" 2 But treating depositors of a
thrift solely as creditors, part of the great unwashed throngs of non-
clients, does not sufficiently protect them against the possible depreda-
tions of controlling persons within the thrift. Depositors stand in a
fiduciary relationship with officers and directors of the thrift.21 Permit-
ting attorneys to ignore breaches of duty to this group by officers and
209. Fraud in Depository Institutions, supra note 43, at 62.
210. 12 C.F.R. § 563.43(b)(5) (1991).
211. See Developments in the Law-Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profession, 94 HARV. L.
REV. 1244, 1337 (1981).
212. See supra text accompanying notes 12-27.
213. Lane v. Chowning, 610 F.2d 1385 (8th Cir. 1979); Garner v. Pearson, 545 F. Supp. 549
(M.D. Fla. 1982), aff'd, 732 F.2d 850 (11th Cir. 1984); 4 CARL ZOLLMAN, THE LAW o BANKS
AND BANKING § 2011 (1936). The Federal Home Loan Bank Board incorporated the common-law
rule in a 1974 Statement of Policy on corporate opportunities:
Directors and officers of an insured institution, and other persons having the power to
direct the management of the institution, stand in a fiduciary relationship to the institu-
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directors increases the possibility that attorneys will facilitate the breach
in some way. Further, under the law of agency, the attorney's relation-
ship to depositors reflects the entity's relationship with those same par-
ties.214 If the entity and its actors have a fiduciary relationship to
depositors, so do the attorneys serving the entity and its actors.
When an attorney represents a client who has fiduciary responsibili-
ties to a third party, Garner v. Wolfinbarger215 and Fickett v. Superior
Court2 6 affirm the idea that the third party cannot be treated with the
same distance that the attorney usually affords to nonients. Further,
other cases hold that an attorney-client relationship may arise without
the formalities previously thought necessary.2 17 These cases, taken to-
gether, suggest at least two approaches to the question of duties to depos-
itors. One view is that third parties who stand in a fiduciary relationship
with the entity client (whom the Author shall call "protected per-
sons") 21 '8 are the attorney's true clients, since all the activities of the en-
tity's agents are performed for their ultimate benefit. Indeed, considering
protected persons as the actual clients of an entity attorney may be bene-
ficial. If they are so considered, they are joint clients, along with the
entity itself. Treating protected persons as joint clients grants them the
full measure of the attorney's devotion and the law's protection. But this
joint client view is problematic. Conflicts of interest between the entity
and the protected persons might be so frequent that an attorney could
never represent an entity. To avoid these difficulties, extending only lim-
ited duties to protected persons might be preferable to designating them
as full clients.
The attorney-client relationship brings with it many duties: the duty
tion and its account holders or shareholders. Out of this relationship arises, among
other things, the duty of protecting the interests of the institutions ....
39 Fed. Reg. 6696 (1974) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 571.9). See also Rettig v. Arlington Hgts. Fed.
Say. and Loan Ass'n, 405 F. Supp. 819 (N.D. Il. 1975) (individual depositors permitted to sue
directors of savings and loan for breach of fiduciary duty under federal common law).
Several courts have held that directors of depository institutions should be held to a higher stan-
dard of conduct that directors of regular corporations. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Smith, 436 F.
Supp. 824 (S.D. Tex. 1977), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 610 F.2d 1258 (5th Cir. 1980); Gadd v.
Pearson, 351 F. Supp. 895 (M.D. Fla. 1972); FSLIC v. Huff, 704 P.2d 372 (Kan. 1985). See also 1
MICHAEL MALLOY, THE CORPORATE LAW OF BANKs 230 n.1 (1988) (citing cases).
214. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 343 (1958).
215. 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971).
216. 558 P.2d 988 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976).
217. See supra text accompanying note 129.
218. Other authors have suggested the names "quasi-client," GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., ETH-
ICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 45 (1978), or "derivative client," L. RAY PAIFrERSON, LEGAL ETH-
ICs: THE LAW OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY 65 (1984).
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of care, the duty of zeal, the duty of loyalty, the duty of communication.
Courts have already granted protected persons rights to information in
some circumstances.2 19 Extensions of other rights, such as the duty of
loyalty, to protected persons is appropriate under existing law to ensure
that their fiduciaries act in their best interests, without making entity
representations totally unworkable. The duty of loyalty requires the at-
torney to identify conflicts of interest between the entity or its agents,
and the protected persons. Attorneys already have the duty to identify
conflicts in their own loyalty under present law,220 in part, because they
are uniquely positioned and qualified to do so. The duty to identify con-
flicts also extends to lawyers representing an organization with its own
fiduciary duties.
In the thrift context, attorneys should consider depositors as a spe-
cial third class of persons, similar to shareholders in a pure corporate
context, to whom the lawyer owes limited duties. Depositors fulfill a role
similar to shareholders in some senses. (This comparison to shareholders
is particularly appropriate if the lawyer is representing a mutual savings
association, since depositors are the equity owners.)221 Depository insti-
tutions such as thrifts raise funds, in part, through the acceptance of de-
posits. A deposit is a debt owed by a depository institution to its
customer, which the customer creates by bringing some asset, usually
cash or negotiable instruments, to the institution.222 When it accepts the
deposit, the institution acquires title to the asset. The institution can
then use the depositor's former funds to create earning assets such as
219. See supra text accompanying notes 173-82.
220. See In re Brownstein, 602 P.2d 655 (Or. 1979) (per curiam).
221. For example, Rowen v. LeMars Mut. Ins. Co., 282 N.W.2d 639 (Iowa 1979), held an
attorney liable to policyholders of a mutual insurance company for participating in a breach of
fiduciary duty by corporate officers. Mutual insurance companies are owned by their policy holders,
in the same way that mutual savings associations are owned by their depositors. The attorney, Dull,
had participated in an illegal sale of the control of the company as part of the sale of the stock of a
separate but related company. The sale of control was a breach of fiduciary duty by the corporate
officers. The court held the attorney liable to the policyholders for participating in the breach of
fiduciary duty by the company's president:
We have already pointed out all who assist or cooperate in the breach of fiduciary duties
- whether directors or not - are liable for the resulting damage. This is particularly
true of one who acted as attorney. His duty is to the entire body of shareholders, or, in
this case, policyholders. His obligation, indeed, is similar to, if not identical with, that of
a director.
Id. at 654. See also Lane v. Chowning, 610 F.2d 1385 (8th Cir. 1979) (attorney serves in same
fiduciary capacity as directors); and Bryan v. Bartlett, 435 F.2d 28 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied sub
nor. Edwards v. Bryan, 402 U.S. 915 (1971).
222. DAVID R. KAMERSCHEN & EUGENE KLISE, MONEY & BANKING 145 (6th ed. 1976).
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loans, to create reserves, or to pay expenses.223 Attracting deposits is
absolutely essential to the continued operation of a depository institution.
Thrifts and other depository institutions do not, technically speaking,
"loan" their deposits, but deposits are a significant source of operating
funds for these institutions.224 Treating depositors solely as creditors
whom an attorney need not consider does not accommodate fairly the
unique role that depositors play in thrift viability. Attorneys have the
duty to identify conflicts of interest within the entity, and to seek counsel,
perhaps through judicial appointment,225 for the depositors as protected
persons.
C. Disclosure of Wrongdoing
The Model Code, as it stood before 1974, required attorneys to re-
veal client fraud to the defrauded person if the fraud occurred during the
representation and the client was unwilling or unable to remedy the
fraud. 2 6 Later, the bar relieved lawyers from this requirement if they
learned of the fraud through privileged communications. Even after the
bar amended the Model Code with respect to client fraud, attorneys still
had the discretion to disclose client conduct that was criminal.
227
The Model Code does not define what constitutes client fraud. Pro-
fessor Wolfram suggests that the term should be defined the same way in
223. Id.
224. The history of the thrift industry during the 1970s and 1980s demonstrates the crucial
nature of deposits. During that time, competition for the savings dollar increased tremendously as
new types of investments became available to the consumer. Typically, these alternative investments
offered higher rates of interest than traditional savings deposits, since thrift interest rates were lim-
ited until the early 1980s. For example, between 1970 imd 1979, interest rate ceilings on thrift
passbook accounts ranged between 5% and 5.25%. During that same period, the three-month
United States Treasury Bill interest rate moved generally upward from 6.46% in 1970 to 12.07% in
December 1979. WHrrm supra note 40, at 63, 68. Interest rate ceilings on thrift accounts were lifted
gradually beginning in 1980. DIDMCA §§ 204-07, 94 Stat. 143-44 (1980) (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§§ 3503-06). As a result, money began to flow around the thrifts into the alternative investments, a
process known as disintermediation. Thrifts that tried to attract deposits by paying market interest
rates after deposit ceilings were lifted generated substantial losses. These institutions were "borrow-
ing short and lending long," WHITE, supra note 40, at 61, by acquiring short-term deposits at market
interest rates and then extending long-term mortgage loans with the funds. Soon, losses in the thrift
industry were enormous: nearly 85% of all thrifts were unprofitable by late 1981. Id. at 70. Com-
mercial banks, however, were not as severely affected. At the time, banks had significantly greater
regulatory flexibility and a different asset mix, which allowed them to preserve their earnings rela-
tively well. SPELLMAN, supra note 12, at 36-37.
225. See, eg., Rowen v. LeMars Mut. Ins. Co., 230 N.W.2d 905 (Iowa 1975), subsequent appeal,
282 N.W.2d 639 (Iowa 1979) (court selected independent counsel to represent interests of defendant
mutual insurance companies in derivative suit brought by policyholders).
226. MODEL CODE, supra note 7, DR 7-102(B)(1).
227. Id. DR 4-101(C)(3).
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all parts of the Model Code: "A client's knowingly false statements, acts,
documents, or similar communications that intentionally induce another
person to act or fail to act in reasonable reliance on the misrepresenta-
tion, and it usually involves an element of personal gain of a financial or
similar kind or a litigational advantage. '228
If thrift insiders committed criminal acts, thrift attorneys were obli-
gated to disclose any future crimes under the Model Code. For exam-
ple,229 a land flip might violate federal criminal statutes on misapplying
funds of depository institutions, 230 and providing false reports or loan
applications to depository institutions.231 More interesting, however, are
the allegations of misconduct by thrift insiders. Many types of insider
abuse should be considered fraud under the Model Code. Recall the alle-
gations that insiders, with the assistance of counsel, structured transac-
tions to avoid loans-to-one-borrower limitations. 232 If insiders and
attorneys in fact intentionally structured transactions to feign regulatory
compliance, they misrepresented the facts of the loan to federal thrift
regulators. Conceivably, an examiner surveying loan files might errone-
ously conclude that a loan complied with federal regulations, and then
forebear from tighter regulatory scrutiny or sanctions. In these types of
transactions, the early form of Model Code DR 7-102(B)(1) bound the
attorneys to disclose the fraud. Even in states adopting the 1974 amend-
ment to DR 7-102(B)(1), other ethical rules still prohibited thrift attor-
neys from participating in the transactions because of the fraud
involved.233
The Model Rules restrict disclosure of client information to a
greater degree than the Model Code. Yet the Model Rules permit attor-
neys to disclose client wrongdoing under some circumstances: to prevent
a crime likely to cause death or serious injury, to establish a lawyer's
claim or defense in a dispute with the client, to defend criminal or civil
complaints against the lawyer, or to defend other proceedings concerning
the attorney's representation. 234
In contrast, Model Rule 1.13 permits withdrawal as the entity law-
yer's last resort if a client persists in wrongdoing. The rule does not ex-
plain how it interacts with the exceptions to confidentiality of Model
228. WOLFRAM, supra note 56, § 13.3.6.
229. This example is taken from Fraud in Depository Institutions, supra note 43, at 62.
230. 18 U.S.C.A. § 656 (West Supp. 1991).
231. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1005, 1014 (West Supp. 1991).
232. See supra text accompanying notes 190-92.
233. MODEL CODE, supra note 7, DR 7-102(A)(7).
234. MODEL RULES, supra note 7, Rule 1.6(b).
[Vol. 40
REPRESENTING THRIFTS
Rule 1.6. For example, what is the attorney's appropriate response if a
corporate client is engaging in conduct that will likely result in imminent
bodily harm?235 If the attorney learns of the conduct and the corpora-
tion refuses to rectify it, may the attorney disclose the information under
the exception in Model Rule 1.6(b)(1),2 36 or may the attorney withdraw
only?
Given the drafting history of Model Rule 1.13,237 arguably Model
Rule 1.13 should control for entity representations. But that conclusion
leads to odd results. If Model Rule 1.13 supersedes Model Rule 1.6, the
rules permit disclosure of conduct likely to physically injure another per-
son if an individual plans to commit the act, but prohibit disclosure if an
entity plans to do so. Disclosure is warranted by the nature of the harm
to be inflicted, not by the nature of actor who inflicts it. The same can be
said for any of the other exceptions to disclosure contained in Model
Rule 1.6: permitting disclosure for individual clients while proscribing it
for entity clients would be nonsensical. Further, the comment to the
Model Rule 1.6 suggests that Model Rule 1.13 does not preempt Model
Rule 1.6 for entity lawyers.238
Under Model Rule 1.6(b)(2), an attorney may disclose information
relating to the representation if necessary to defend the attorney against
civil claims arising from actions involving the client.239 Formal proceed-
ings need not have been filed before the lawyer may disclose otherwise
protected information. 2" Thrift attorneys would have been justified in
disclosing client wrongdoing under this exception.
The Model Rules, moreover, support the view that attorneys may
evaluate decisions of confidentiality differently in different contexts. The
comment to Model Rule 1.13, speaking of government attorneys, says
235. See, eg., Balla v. Gambro, 560 N.E.2d 1043 (Il. App. Ct. 1990), appeal docketed, No.
70942 (IIL. Nov. 1990) (company attempted to sell defective kidney dialysis machines that did not
alleviate kidney dysfunction in the persons using them).
236. "A lawyer may reveal [information relating to the representation] to the extent the lawyer
reasonably believes necessary . . . to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the
lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm." MODEL RULEs,
supra note 7, Rule 1.6(b)(1).
237. See supra text accompanying notes 98-101.
238. "Where the client is an organization, the lawyer may be in doubt whether contemplated
conduct will actually be carried out by the organization. Where necessary to guide conduct in con-
nection with this Rule, the lawyer may make inquiry within the organization as indicated in Rule
1.13(b)." MODEL RULES, supra note 7, Rule 1.6 cmt.
239. The rule says: "A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer reasonably
believes necessary ... to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer
based upon conduct in which the client was involved ..... Id. Rule. 1.6(b)(2).
240. Id. Rule 1.6 cmt.
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that "when the client is a governmental organization, a different balance
may be appropriate between maintaining confidentiality and assuring
that the wrongful official act is prevented or rectified, for public business
is involved.""24 The comment also suggests that government attorneys
may scrutinize the conduct of government officials, who are actors for
their client, more closely than would attorneys for private enterprises.
The "public business" of which the comment speaks is not the sole prov-
ince of government attorneys. Some industries, such as the thrift indus-
try, are so intimately tied to the nation's welfare that they, too, involve
public business. The comprehensive regulation of the industry reflects
the public concern with these institutions; it is a "reflection of the Ameri-
can political system's long-standing and deeply rooted belief that deposi-
tory institutions are 'special': that their crucial roles as providers of
credit... to businesses and households and as repositories for deposit
moneys by the rest of the economy make them special."'242
Like their counterparts in the securities industry, thrift attorneys
serve as gatekeepers. Without them, their clients cannot create assets
(that is, extend loans), file necessary regulatory documents, or perform
many other tasks essential to the operation of the institution. Like their
counterparts in the Securities and Exchange Commission, thrift regula-
tors rely on the gatekeepers to promote compliance with the regulatory
scheme. The scope of the thrift crisis, and the litany of complaints
against counsel, testify to the consequences of misplaced reliance. The
comment to Model Rule 1.13 rightfully suggests that an attorney for a
client whose misconduct may cause widespread public harm, such as a
thrift attorney, should be permitted to evaluate confidentiality obliga-
tions differently. The modern rules of ethics have always recognized that
the degree of harm to others may warrant exceptions to traditional rules
of confidentiality. The rules have also provided exceptions to duties
when necessary to protect larger societal interests.
One might criticize the suggestion that an attorney should reveal
client wrongdoing because the lawyer then relinquishes his or her role as
an advocate for the client's wishes. But that criticism does not deal ade-
quately with several points. First, the rules already obligate attorneys to
ignore their clients' wishes under some circumstances and to protect
other societal interests. For example, attorneys must protect former cli-
ents, other clients, third persons, and themselves, by identifying conflicts
241. Id. Rule 1.13 cmt.
242. WHiE, supra note 40, at 25.
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of interest.24 They must protect tribunals, 24 whether adjudicative or
non-adjudicative,245 by revealing client perjury and other fraud on the
tribunals. They must protect the integrity of the profession by revealing
wrongdoing by other lawyers,24 even if their own clients would prefer
that wrongdoing be kept secret.2 47 And, most importantly, attorneys
must not effectuate the client's wishes if they are criminal or fraudu-
lent.248 These obligations limit the attorney's advocacy, but do not viti-
ate it.
Second, the view that an attorney must always function solely as an
advocate for the client assumes that advocacy consistently fulfills a valua-
ble purpose.249 That assumption may be valid in litigation where theo-
retically, one well-prepared advocate meets another, and each of them
brings to an impartial tribunal the merits of his or her own cause, and the
demerits of the adversary's. Our adversary system assumes that the
court will decide the case justly and protect other interests through ap-
propriate remedies or procedural devices. In the environment in which
business lawyers practice, however, the features of the adversary system
that are supposed to promote the search for truth and justice simply do
not exist. 2 0 Even the Model Rules recognize that the lawyer's role
ought to be different if there is no adversary. Why else would the rules
require an attorney in an ex parte proceeding to inform the court of unfa-
vorable yet salient facts?
251
Again examining the thrift example, let us view a typical loan trans-
action. The two principal parties to the transaction are the thrift and the
borrower. The thrift, if it is typically motivated, wishes to document the
243. MODEL RULES, supra note 7, Rule 1.7.
244. Id. Rule 3.3.
245. Id. Rule 3.9.
246. Id. Rule 8.3.
247. See In re Himmel, 533 N.E.2d 790 (l1. 1989) (attorney disciplined for not reporting mis-
conduct of client's former attorney, even though client had requested attorney not to report).
248. MODEL RULES, supra note 7, Rule 1.2(d).
249. Two eminent scholars who hold that view are Monroe Freedman and Charles Fried. See
MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAwYERS' ETHics N AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 9-26 (1975), and Charles
Fried, The Lawyer as Friend- The Moral Foundation of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J.
1060 (1976).
250: See Harry W. Jones, Lawyers and Justice: The Uneasy Ethics of Partisanship, 23 VILL. L.
REV. 957 (1978).
251. MODEL RULES, supra note 7, Rule 3.3(d), which provides: "[i]n an ex parte proceeding, a
lawyer shall inform the tribunal of all material facts known to the lawyer which will enable the
tribunal to make an informed decision, whether or not the facts are adverse." The accompanying
comment justifies the rule by noting the absence of a balancing presentation by the adversary and the
judge's overarching responsibility of rendering justice.
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loan in a way that protects the safety and soundness of the institution.
An ordinary thrift will be concerned with matters such as whether the
loan documents permit the thrift to realize on its collateral effectively.
The borrower, if it is typically motivated, wishes to lighten the personal
and administrative burdens of the loan terms. An ordinary borrower will
be concerned with matters such as whether the loan documents require
personal liability for the debt or permit grace periods or notice before
default. Other parties to a transaction may exist, such as the seller of
property involved in the deal. But the interests of those parties do not
drive the transaction in the same way that the interests of the thrift and
borrower do. If a thrift is operating properly, then the ordinary self-
interest of the thrift also will protect interested parties such as depositors.
But if the thrift is operating unsoundly, nothing protects the depositors
except for the possibility of regulatory review at some point in the future.
If the thrift has concealed the true nature of the transaction from the
regulators, that possibility becomes even more remote. Here the adver-
sary system is meaningless.
VII. CHANGES IN THE MODEL RULES
Denying the significant involvement of lawyers in the thrift crisis is
difficult. Many of the questionable transactions could not have been con-
summated without the participation of lawyers. The myriad transactions
described in the complaints against counsel, many of them highly com-
plex, could not have occurred without the assistance of sophisticated
counsel: many transactions required complicated structures and lengthy
documentation to accomplish the ends desired by thrift operators.
Model Rule 1.13 encourages unethical participation in transactions
by entity lawyers because it provides attorneys with a tremendous incen-
tive to remain ignorant about the client's real motives. Model Rule 1.13
is not triggered until the attorney actually knows of wrongdoing within
the entity. So long as the attorney can convince himself or herself that
the attorney did not "know" of misconduct by the client,252 the attorney
can avoid the difficult ethical choices that may lead to confrontation with
the client and loss of the client's business. If an attorney can rationalize
his or her involvement as merely fulfilling the client's wishes, the attor-
ney can remain unconcerned with the larger implications of the work.
The flaw of the entity theory, as articulated in Model Rule 1.13, is that it
252. Under the Model Rules, knowledge means actual knowledge, although it may be estab-
lished circumstantially. Id. Preamble.
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permits attorneys to hide behind the putative wishes of the client, as ar-
ticulated by controlling persons, without considering whether those in-
structions may damage others with whom the controlling persons stand
in a special relationship. The current rules do not animate the lawyer to
consider whether the attorney's services are being used to facilitate a
crime or fraud, activities that are beyond the permissible scope of the
representation under Model Rule 1.2.253 Nor do they give the lawyer
sufficient reason to investigate whether individual transactions are part of
a larger pattern of illegal or improper activity. That counsel in the thrift
cases were completely and continuously unaware of the self-serving mo-
tives of the controlling persons within the thrifts strains credulity. Law-
yers did not serve as mere scriveners in all of these transactions. They
frequently participated actively in the structuring of transactions.2"4 But
so long as the thrift attorneys avoided the abyss of "knowing," Model
Rule 1.13 did not obligate them to act. The rule should be changed to
require explicitly that an attorney exert reasonable efforts to ensure that
the client is not committing a fraud on other persons or a breach of fidu-
ciary duty. Without such a positive duty, an attorney cannot comply
fully with his or her obligation not to assist wrongful conduct by the
client. Prohibiting participation in crime or fraud without also imposing
a duty to investigate is an empty exercise.
Model Rule 1.13 presently gives an attorney the discretion to with-
draw from a representation when the lawyer knows of wrongdoing that
the entity will not rectify. Because of their own self-interest in maintain-
ing lucrative client relationships, or their interest in avoiding potentially
hostile confrontations with clients, lawyers are not likely to exercise that
discretion. As a result, client wrongs are likely to go unaddressed. To
avoid this problem, Model Rule 1.13 should mandate the attorney's
withdrawal if the client refuses to correct its misconduct. Attorneys
might remain reluctant to investigate client conduct, for fear that they
will learn dark secrets that will compel withdrawal. But the presence of
a mandatory duty in the rules, rather than a discretionary one, might
frighten attorneys a great deal more: the violation of a mandatory disci-
plinary rule might support a later civil malpractice action or disciplinary
proceeding.255
253. Id. Rule 1.2(d), which provides that "[a] lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or
assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent ... 
254. See supra text accompanying notes 190-210.
255. See, eg., Lipton v. Boesky, 313 N.W.2d 163 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (attorney's breach of
Model Code created rebuttable evidence of malpractice).
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As a companion measure, Model Rule 1.13 should obligate an attor-
ney who withdraws from an entity representation because of client
wrongdoing to disavow his or her work product.25 6 If attorneys do not
do so, they could be aiding and abetting misconduct by the client. Under
tort law, a person can be held liable for aiding and abetting an independ-
ent wrong if that person renders substantial assistance to the wrongful
act by another and the aider and abetter was generally aware of his or her
role.257 Silence can constitute assistance of a primary breach.258 Disa-
vowal of work product could avoid aiding and abetting liability, since it
is a form of communication about the client's conduct. In order to avoid
aiding a breach of duty by a representative of an entity, attorneys should
have a duty to speak symbolically through withdrawal from the represen-
tation and disavowal of work product.259
VIII. CONCLUSION
This country will feel the effects of the collapse of the thrift industry
for many years. Misconduct by thrift insiders undoubtedly contributed
to the degringolade although the magnitude of their contribution is a
matter of some debate. The extent to which attorneys may have facili-
tated misconduct raises disturbing questions about the appropriate limits
of entity representation, questions that the ethical codes encourage attor-
neys to ignore.
256. See generally MODEL RULES, supra note 7, Rule 1.6 cmt., which says that the general rule
on confidentiality does not prevent "the lawyer from giving notice of the fact of withdrawal, and the
lawyer may also withdraw or disaffirm any opinion, document, affirmation, or the like." See also
Ronald D. Rotunda, The Notice of Withdrawal and the New Model Rules of Professional Conduct:
Blowing the Whistle and Waving the Red Flag, 63 OR. L. REv. 455 (1984).
257. See Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472,477-78 (D.C. Cir. 1983). See also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1977).
258. SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682, 713 (D.D.C. 1978) (finding aiding
and abetting liability under securities laws for keeping silent in face of improper merger). But see
Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84, 97 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that aiding and abetting liability
may be inferred from atypical conduct, and that the aider and abettor "must knowingly render
substantial assistance").
259. A related issue is the proper recipient of notice. If the proposed rule were applied to
thrifts, mandating disclosure to depositors would be impracticable for several reasons. The number
of depositors is potentially large, making notice costly and laborious. Further, many depositors are
unlikely to be sufficiently sophisticated to understand the meaning of the notice. One solution would
be disclosure to thrift regulators in the stead of depositors. If the institution becomes insolvent and
the insurance fund pays depositors, the fund is subrogated to the rights of the depositors in any
event. Further, allowing regulators to exercise rights on behalf of the protected class of depositors is
practically sensible. See Donovan v. Fitzsimmons, 90 F.R.D. 583 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (allowing Secre-
tary of Labor, as representative of pension plan beneficiaries, to discover confidential information
between pension plan and its counsel).
REPRESENTING THRIFTS
From their inception, national ethical standards have reflected the
typical model of the individual retaining an attorney to resolve a discrete
problem. Yet many clients are not individuals, but entities. The codes,
with their implicit paradigm of individual representation, view the entity
alone as the true client. But this approach belies the protean complexi-
ties of entity representation. Reacting to the artificial simplicity of the
ethical rules, many courts have taken a more realistic approach to defin-
ing the client in an entity representation, which focuses on the reasonable
expectations of the entity's actors. Other aspects of traditional ethical
doctrine reflect the same kind of artificiality as the entity rule. The or-
thodox view of the means of creating an attorney-client relationship
holds that the attorney must explicitly agree to serve the putative client.
Once that relationship exists, the attorney "knows but one person in the
world, and that person is his client."2" But again, many courts have
spurned this position. They have recognized less formal means of creat-
ing an attorney-client relationship and extended to third parties duties
historically reserved for clients.
In light of these developments, the challenged conduct of many
thrift attorneys is ethically questionable. Sadly, the ethical rules promote
a false sanguinity among attorneys concerning the propriety of their con-
duct. The realistic approaches courts have taken to the issues of repre-
sentation of entities, creation of relationships, and extension of duties
indicate that attorneys have far greater duties to depositors and regula-
tors than the ethical codes alone suggest.
The role of attorneys in the thrift fiasco highlights several deficien-
cies in the ethical rules concerning entities in general. The rules, as cur-
rently written, ostensibly prohibit attorneys from participating in
misconduct by their clients, yet simultaneously discourage attorneys
from investigating their clients' activities. Significant change is necessary
if attorneys are to avoid participating in conflicts of interest or miscon-
duct by their entity clients.
260. 2 TRIAL OF QUEEN CAROLINE 8 (J. Nightingale ed. 1821).
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